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ABSTRACT 
 
The Political Economy of Going Global: Understanding the Determinants of Chinese 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Middle East and Africa 
 
By 
 
Majid Shirali 
  
Dr. John Tuman, Examination Committee Chair 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
This study seeks to explain the motivating factors behind Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) patterns to the Middle East and Africa through a quantitative 
framework that utilizes a pooled cross-sectional time-series data set that covers 57 
countries from 2003-2010.  Prior research on the issue has hypothesized that China 
attempts to use external FDI to developing areas to promote national interests and help 
sustain economic growth.  However, there has been an almost exclusive focus on 
economic determinants while generally ignoring political variables.  The approach in this 
project attempts to fill this scholarly void by employing a broad array of independent 
variables that account for both economic and political influences in producing a timely 
model that yields robust results that will allow for generalizable statements to be made 
regarding the data.  The findings demonstrate that pre-existing trade relations and 
strategically important natural resources (oil, ores, and metals) within host economies 
influence Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa.  In addition, the study empirically 
shows that external FDI from China was heavily concentrated in economies with lower 
per capita income and directed toward regimes that may be classified as mildly 
authoritarian.  The dissertation concludes with an analysis of larger policy implications 
and suggestions for future scholarly inquiry. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) position as the world’s leading emerging 
economy has for years made the country a top target for international investment.  Inward 
flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulated domestic growth and the expansion 
of China’s market size.  A very large population, coupled with greater consumption, has 
made the socio-economic status quo unsustainable in the long-term as evidenced by 
frequent episodes of political unrest.  Thus, securing new and dependable avenues for 
growth has created a convergence of interests for the business and political communities 
in China as they seek to keep up with national expansion.  As the PRC has grown, this 
intersection between the private and public sectors has led to the desire to increase the 
country’s global footprint, which, in turn, brings us to the relatively recent rise in external 
FDI emanating from China.  Increasing the amount of outward bound FDI has been a 
crucial component of Chinese policy dating back to the early 2000s.1  Beginning with the 
10th Five Year Plan in 2001 and extending into the 11th (2006-2010) and 12th (2011-2015) 
Five Year Plans, the government continued to utilize these socio-economic initiatives to 
express the need to bolster international investment by Chinese firms.  Wen Jiabao, 
speaking in 2010 as Premier, succinctly stated that:  
We must accelerate the implementation of the ‘go global’ strategy, in accordance 
with market orientation and the principle of independent decision-making and 
guide enterprises with different kinds of ownership to invest overseas and 
cooperate in an orderly manner.2 
 
 
                                                            
1 See Figure 1 from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) below. 
2 Ken Davies. “China Investment Policy: An Update.”  OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, 1 (2013): 35. 
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One year later, he reiterated China’s stance by elaborating further on the issue: 
We will accelerate the implementation of the ‘go global’ strategy, improve 
relevant support policies, simplify examination and approval procedures, and 
provide assistance for qualified enterprises and individuals to invest overseas. We 
will encourage enterprises to operate internationally in an active yet orderly 
manner. We will strengthen macro guidance over overseas investments, improve 
the mechanisms for stimulating and protecting them, and guard against 
investment risks.3 
 
Initially, Chinese multi-national corporations (MNCs) mostly focused on 
investment projects in developed countries in order to seek assets such as superior skills, 
marketing expertise, and proprietary technologies.4  More recently, however, there has 
been a remarkably strong increase in outflows of Chinese FDI to the Developing World.  
The majority of this new pattern of Chinese FDI has been located in East Asia and 
Africa.  Nevertheless, Chinese firms have also begun to concentrate on aggressively 
investing and expanding their operations in the Middle East and Latin America. 
Deepening our knowledge of the pattern of Chinese FDI will allow for a better 
understanding of the motivations underlying the decision-making process of Chinese 
multi-national corporations.  As the comments above by former Premier Wen indicate, 
attention also needs to be paid to the role of the Chinese state in facilitating external 
investment.  Thus, analyzing the determinants of Chinese FDI to the strategically 
important region of the Middle East and economically vital continent of Africa will help 
explain the rationale and implications of Beijing’s “Going Global” policy.5  Investigating 
the international activities of Chinese firms is also important vis-à-vis the potential for 
                                                            
3 Ibid.  
4 Ping Deng.  “Investing for strategic resources and its rationale: The case of outward FDI from 
Chinese companies.”  Business Horizons, 50, 1 (January-February 2007): 72-74. 
5 Beijing’s initiative encouraging external FDI by Chinese firms is interchangeably referred to in 
English as a policy of “Going Global,” “Go Global,” and/or “Go Out.”       
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Beyond identifying the factors behind outflows of Chinese FDI to the Middle East 
and Africa, a study of this issue will provide a valuable opportunity for an analysis of the 
explanatory power of existing models of FDI, which draw largely upon references to 
firms in advanced industrialized economies.  Previous paradigms seeking to explain the 
nature of external Chinese FDI have made important contributions to painting a clearer 
picture of this process, but their residual limitations fail to completely capture all the 
facets that lead to a firm’s decision to go abroad.  Moreover, recent scholarly inquiry into 
the issue has focused solely upon the latent economic causes of Chinese overseas 
investment.8  Although an observer may expect political conditions in the host country to 
have an impact on the investment behavior of Chinese multi-national firms, there has 
been practically no empirical research done on the effects that revolutionary violence, 
rights, and liberties have on Chinese FDI flows.9  
 
Defining the Middle East and Africa        
We will be examining the relationship between outward Chinese foreign direct 
investment to the Middle East and Africa as a whole.  Thus, conceptualizing the region 
and continent may run the risk of being a self-explanatory exercise.  Nevertheless, it may 
also be important to fully define the contours of the geographic area under consideration 
                                                            
8 For a representative example, see Suma Athreye and Sandeep Kapur.  “Introduction: The  
internationalization of Chinese and Indian firms—trends, motivations and strategy.”  Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 18, 2 (April 2009): 209-221. 
9 For an exception to this orthodoxy, see Peter J. Buckley., L. Jeremy Clegg, Adam R. Cross, Xin 
Liu, Hinrich Voss, and Ping Zheng.  “The determinants of Chinese outward foreign direct investment.”  
Journal of International Business Studies, 38, 4 (July 2007): 499-518.  Their study, however, did not 
distinguish amongst different types of instability and pooled observations from the markets of developing 
and developed countries. 
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in order to address possible methodological questions.  What is meant when we say the 
Middle East and Africa?  Are we referring to abstract concepts, arbitrary labels based on 
tradition, or classifications used to accurately designate territory?  Does the meaning of 
these terms change as they are applied to different contexts or is there a standard 
definition that is used in a uniform manner? 
The term Middle East seemingly originated in the 1850s as the British were 
seeking a way to distinguish Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia from the Far East.  The 
Near East was simultaneously being used to describe the territory under the control of the 
Ottoman Empire.  While the term Near East can still be found in political, academic, and 
policy circles, the term Middle East over time became synonymous with Iran, Turkey, 
Israel, and the Arab states of North Africa and West Asia.  Due to the fact that these 
states stretch across Asia and Africa, the region may also be referred to as the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) to account for countries being located on both continents.  
Despite Sudan sharing ethnic, religious, and linguistic similarities with its neighbors to 
the north, Khartoum is usually considered part of sub-Saharan Africa due to the country’s 
geographic position being primarily south of the Sahara Desert.  Another subjective 
distinction is Afghanistan’s absence from the territory comprising the modern Middle 
East despite its historic connections to the region.  Afghans have similar linguistic, 
religious, historical, and cultural identities as those living right next door in Iran, but 
often times find themselves grouped together with the rest of Southwest Asia (Pakistan, 
India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) when it comes to area studies.10   
                                                            
10 For a fairly standard example of this approach, see Devin T. Hagerty, Editor.  South Asia in 
World Politics.  Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005.   
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The origin of the term Africa, on the other hand, is more ancient and derived from 
the Latin word Afri, which was used to refer to Carthaginians who lived in what is now 
Tunisia during the 9th century BC.  The suffix of the term (-ica) is also Latin and can be 
used to describe a piece of land.  Due to the arbitrary nature of the borders created by 
European colonialists, independent African states were more artificial than other polities 
due to the disregard of the ethnic, tribal, linguistic, religious, and cultural boundaries that 
existed amongst the people of the continent.  These imposed creations have made 
stability, national unity, and territorial integrity much harder to achieve in post-colonial 
Africa.  Eritrea breaking away from Ethiopia in 1991 and South Sudan’s separation from 
Sudan in 2011 are two recent examples of the volatile nature of Africa’s borders.    
Although the populations of African states are extremely heterogeneous, the line 
that separates the study of African politics from Middle Eastern studies in academia is 
fairly straightforward.  The predominantly Arab-Muslim countries of North Africa are 
grouped together with the Middle East proper while every state that is either completely 
or partially below the Sahara Desert is studied as part of Africa.  There are differences, 
however, in terms of classification at the international level.  During qualification for the 
World Cup and certain sporting events during the Olympic Games, North Africa is 
grouped together with the rest of sub-Saharan Africa.  Moreover, multi-lateral 
organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU), aggregate the 
continent as a whole when it comes to membership.11 
                                                            
11 While Morocco is a member of most multi-lateral African organizations, it withdrew its 
membership from the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU’s predecessor, in 1984 due to a 
dispute over occupied Western Sahara and has not returned since. 
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Consequently, as we can clearly see, a neat classification of regional and 
continental nation-states is not always possible.  Much of what we refer to as the Middle 
East and Africa today is in fact due to convention and modern tradition.  Therefore, the 
answers to the questions above may very well depend on our sources of information, but 
for the purposes of this project we define the Middle East as a set of geographically 
contiguous nation-states that begin with Morocco in northwest Africa and extend all the 
way east to Iran.  This stretch of land encompasses all the Arab states of North Africa as 
well as the remaining Arab countries outside the continent and includes Turkey and Israel 
in addition to Iran as the only non-Arab states of the Middle East.  Although the Middle 
East is diverse ethnically, linguistically, religiously, and culturally, the majority of the 
region’s population has an Arab ethnic affiliation, speaks a dialect of Arabic, and 
practices a form of Islam.  Most of the modern Middle East also shares similar historical 
experiences of foreign domination and autocratic rule and an arid climate that is known 
for its sweltering heat. 
It is important to note that while Israel is a political and geographic reality within 
the Middle East, the Jewish state’s official diplomatic relations and unofficial regular 
interactions with only a handful of governments within the region keep it isolated and 
prevent it from becoming fully integrated politically and economically.  Moreover, the 
Israeli regime, despite discriminatory practices against Arab citizens of Palestinian origin 
and other minority groups, is considered a developed political system.  The topic of this 
dissertation focuses on Chinese FDI in the developing political systems of the Middle 
East and Africa. 
8 
 
Correspondingly, Africa is defined as a group of sub-Saharan nation-states that 
are primarily located in one continental land mass.  There are 54 countries on the 
continent of Africa and 49 of them are in sub-Saharan Africa once we subtract the five 
North African states of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia that are usually 
considered part of the greater Middle East.12  Five of the remaining 49 states in sub-
Saharan Africa are island nations and one is located completely inside the borders of 
another country.  Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles are 
located off the eastern and western coasts of Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho is 
entirely surrounded by South Africa.  The continent consists of a wide-range of tribal 
groups, linguistic affiliations, ethnic identities, religious traditions, and cultural norms 
and practices that cannot be adequately treated here.  The Congo by itself, centrally 
located in a vast area that encompasses approximately 250 ethnic groups who speak over 
240 languages, represents a microcosm of Africa as it provides us with a glimpse of the 
continent’s diversity.13  The majority of modern Africa has also had to contend with 
foreign occupation and post-colonial authoritarianism in a climate that ranges from dry 
and barren in the northern half to lush and tropical in the central part with temperate 
conditions in the southern portion of the continent.   
 
 
 
                                                            
12 There are two proto-states in Africa that have unilaterally declared independence.  Somaliland 
in the Horn of Africa and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in Western Sahara have both established 
a measure of sovereignty over territory, but have limited international recognition.  
 13 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja.  The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila, A People’s History.  London 
and New York: Zed Books, 2002, p. 14.  
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Main Topic and Research Question 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to simply acknowledge that China has 
begun heavily targeting the Middle East and Africa for investment, but rather to provide a 
unique lens that furthers an understanding of Chinese FDI to the region and continent by 
identifying the motivating factors behind these investment patterns.  Explaining this 
process vis-à-vis these two crucial areas within the Developing World should serve to 
enhance our overall knowledge of the direction that outward Chinese investment has 
taken.  By examining a wide-range of economic and political factors, an attempt will be 
made to identify the determinants that are responsible for external flows of Chinese 
foreign direct investment to the Middle East and Africa.  Beyond recognizing these root 
causes, a fuller analysis will also offer an explanation of how Chinese multi-national 
firms go about selecting countries for investment and the role that Beijing plays in 
facilitating external FDI.  To this end, the main contribution of this project is the 
development of a quantitative framework for the proper study of Chinese foreign direct 
investment in the Middle East and Africa. 
Academic scholarship on the relatively new phenomenon of Chinese FDI in the 
Developing World is comparatively understudied.  Much of the research on Chinese FDI 
has focused either on internal investment in China by foreign firms or on the external 
investment activities of Chinese corporations in advanced industrialized nations.  Past 
investigations that have tackled the topic of Chinese FDI in the Global South have 
provided crucial commentary, but a great deal of emphasis has been placed on economic 
factors at the expense of studying the political variables that affect the decision of 
10 
 
Chinese MNCs to go abroad.14  The approach in this dissertation will attempt to fill this 
scholarly void by conducting a cross-sectional time-series using a broad array of 
independent variables that not only cover economic indicators, but also highlight political 
influences to produce a timely model that yields robust results in explaining the flow of 
Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa.  This will be done to design a multi-
dimensional perspective that seeks to more comprehensively account for the wide-range 
of factors affecting the patterns of Chinese FDI to the region and continent.       
Another feature of this study to more deeply grasp the causes and effects of 
Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa is the policy implications of China’s drive to 
expand globally.  By synthesizing a large amount of variables that cut across economic 
and political lines, this paradigm will seek to provide the appropriate prism in which to 
also understand China’s economic and business climate as it relates to outward FDI and 
the role of the Chinese state in stimulating these activities.  These dynamics have key 
international policy consequences as competition intensifies between Chinese firms and 
their American and European counterparts for investment opportunities in different parts 
of the Developing World.  These are all important issues that this project will take under 
consideration as we go forward and examine the elements that impact Chinese FDI in the 
Middle East and Africa in order to better comprehend the nature of this ongoing process. 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
The following chapters consist of a theoretical approach to understanding cross-
national studies of foreign direct investment and its application to China, a rigorous 
                                                            
14 A comprehensive discussion on this issue will take place in Chapter 2.   
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literature review, an explanation of data and methods, a presentation of the main findings, 
and concluding thoughts that take into account the policy ramifications of China going 
global. 
Chapter 2 describes the dominant model used by scholars to study FDI flows and 
analyzes its utility in explaining the international operations of Chinese companies while 
conducting a comprehensive literature review on the subject and presenting various 
hypotheses that buttress our main research question.  Each of the three components of the 
OLI framework for FDI, ownership advantages (O), location advantages (L), and 
internalization (I), will be examined as they relate to China.  The chapter discusses the 
hypothesized effects of economic and political influences on inflows of FDI from China 
as well.  There will also be further background provided on the modern Middle East and 
Africa in order to fully conceptualize the target areas of Chinese FDI that are being 
analyzed in this dissertation.  Subsequently, a broad survey on the extant literature 
regarding the motivations for internationalization by Chinese firms and the country’s 
growing relationship with the Middle East and Africa will take place to improve our 
insight on these two converging phenomena.  The end goal of presenting these secondary 
sources and hypotheses is to provide the reader with a foundation in comprehending 
Chinese FDI habits, which can then be used as a platform to interpret the results of the 
quantitative methodology presented in this dissertation. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the accumulated data and the 
methods employed to measure that information.  The research design operationalizes the 
dependent variable, categorizes the independent variables, and identifies the sources that 
comprise the data set.  The methodological approach to understanding this issue strives to 
12 
 
encompass all the possible variables that could impact external Chinese investment by 
gathering information from a heterogeneous group of sources.  In attempting to validate 
the theoretical assumptions and hypotheses mentioned in the second chapter, a 
representative amount of data is collected to test our assertions.  The broad assortment of 
data begins measuring Chinese FDI flows from the early 2000s when Beijing started 
prioritizing outward bound foreign investment up until the end of the decade. 
Chapter 4 presents the main findings of the statistical analysis.  The data set will 
focus on analyzing a set of factors within 57 countries in the Middle East and Africa to 
determine if there exists a causal link between these nation-states and the flow of Chinese 
FDI.  The eight year time-span under consideration will also give the ability to discern 
any early historical trends within the data.  As the sample data is expanded by spreading 
it across time, not only can patterns of Chinese FDI to the Developing World be 
highlighted, their level of connectivity to the present posture of Chinese foreign 
investment may become visible as well.  The rationale behind this particular aspect of our 
approach is to ensure that our quantitative lens is relatively exhaustive enough for us to 
be able to make generalizable statements about the investment behavior of Chinese firms 
that are reasonably robust.  The ultimate purpose of this exercise is to produce a 
quantitative perspective that can serve as an analytical tool to help provide a fuller 
understanding of the aggressive expansion of external FDI that has been underway in 
China for over a decade now. 
The concluding chapter summarizes the results and determines whether they lend 
support to pre-existing theories of FDI that are applied to China.  While doing so, we also 
probe the limitations and explanatory power of our approach to understanding the logic 
13 
 
of Chinese foreign direct investment in the Middle East and Africa by analyzing the 
usefulness of the employed framework in furthering our knowledge of the subject matter.  
We will take a look at the broader applicability of our study in helping to explain external 
Chinese investment in other parts of the Developing World as well.  The dissertation ends 
with remarks that tie thoughts and ideas together while detailing potential policy 
implications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CHINESE FDI IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, 
AND HYPOTHESES 
 Over the past decade and a half there has been a precipitous increase in outward 
bound Chinese foreign direct investment in different locations throughout the world.  
During the initial stages of this process, Chinese firms primarily targeted investment 
opportunities in advanced industrialized countries for the purposes of acquiring 
strategically important assets.  The second phase of going global has seen the rapid rise of 
Chinese FDI in large parts of the Developing World.  The expansion of external Chinese 
investment did not spring up spontaneously nor did the penetration of new markets 
happen overnight.  Political and socio-economic initiatives spearheaded by the Chinese 
government and domestic growth along with a range of other factors paved the way for 
this contemporary phenomenon. 
The literature review in this chapter is organized thematically so that we may 
isolate and properly address each issue within the broader topic before moving forward 
and summarizing the argument and detailing the expectations.  First, an overview of the 
modern Middle East and Africa coupled with further conceptualization of these two host 
areas of Chinese FDI will serve to provide the necessary background to appropriately 
contextualize the region and continent.  The next sections turns to the history of Chinese 
FDI with particular emphasis on the role played by the state and the economic influences 
that affect China’s investment activities.  Subsequently, the focus shifts to understanding 
the political motivations behind Chinese FDI and the foreign policy goals that Beijing is 
attempting to achieve through commercial activities.  The final portion of the literature 
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review offers a discussion of Sino-African and Sino-Middle Eastern relations for us to 
better interpret the interactions both have had with China.   
Beyond merely a descriptive account of the secondary literature on Chinese FDI, 
this chapter also elaborates on the theoretical approach that is frequently associated with 
cross-national studies of foreign direct investment while discussing how it relates to 
China as we incorporate various hypotheses on the subject.  What emerges as we seek to 
understand the primary causal factors affecting outflows of Chinese FDI is a constellation 
of complex forces and conditions that have been coalescing to create the necessary space 
for multi-national corporations from mainland China to operate in.  By attempting to 
offer a deeper understanding of the changes in China’s posture vis-à-vis outflows of FDI, 
there are questions that need to be answered: What specifically were the root causes that 
led to the decision to go global?  What kinds of tactics and strategies have firms from 
China been employing?  How have outcomes varied?  Under what political conditions 
and socio-economic circumstances do Chinese corporations seek to go abroad?  What 
roles have non-Chinese actors played in this process?  As we analyze a common 
theoretical approach to studying FDI, these questions amongst others will be addressed 
by examining the literature on the issue and determining to what extent the academic 
scholarship on the subject cohesively captures the determinants of foreign direct invest 
emanating from China while striving to ultimately address the main research question: 
What explains the flows of Chinese foreign direct investment to the Middle East and 
Africa? 
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Review of the Literature (I): The Middle East and Africa 
The Middle East and Africa as Regional Sub-Systems 
Are the terms Middle East and Africa a facile and nebulous way of referring to a 
similar group of countries that have been lumped together based on Eurocentric 
conceptions or can the region and continent be characterized as systems with their own 
set of unique features and distinct characteristics?  While an in-depth analysis of Middle 
Eastern and African politics is beyond the scope of this paper, attempting to articulate to 
what extent the region and continent can be referred to as political systems may be useful 
in further conceptualizing these two important hosts of external Chinese foreign direct 
investment before delving into a historical overview. 
James Dougherty and Robert Pflatzgraff identify a system as: 
 
“[a] whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its 
parts” and “the concept of system connotes relationships between units.  The units 
of a system are of the same ‘set,’ by which is meant that they have features in 
common that enable a particular relationship.”1 
 
Thus, there exists an international system whose structure has taken on different forms 
over time.  The structure of the system can range from unipolar to bipolar to multipolar as 
its units interact and communicate with one another.  Regions, therefore, can be treated as 
sub-systems of the overarching international system.2  Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel 
tell us that regional sub-systems are made up of:  
“one state, or of two or more proximate and interacting states which have some 
common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense 
                                                            
1 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pflatzgraff, Jr.  Contending Theories of International 
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey.  New York: Longman, 1997, p. 102.  
2 Ibid., p. 115.  
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of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to 
the system.”3 
 
William Thompson provides us with further guidelines, which include: 
“regularity and intensity of interactions to the point where change in one part 
affects other parts; general proximity of actors; internal and external recognition 
of the subsystem as a distinctive area; units of power that are relatively inferior to 
units in the dominant system; subordination in the sense that a change in the 
dominant system will have a greater effect on the subsystem than the reverse; 
intensive and influential penetration of the subsystem by the dominant system 
than the reverse; some degree of integration; common developmental status; and 
at least two or more actors in the subsystem.”4 
 
Based on the criteria above, one may argue that the Middle East and sub-Saharan 
Africa qualify as systems/regional sub-systems.  The aforementioned similarities of 
geographic proximity and territorial continuity allow for direct relationships and constant 
contact between units.5  The contiguous nature of much of the system along with the 
interrelatedness of its parts means that actions in one place can have consequences in 
another.  The overthrow of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia began a domino effect as 
mass protests and rebellions spread to neighboring states and beyond.  Civil war in Syria 
has put pressure on other states as millions of refugees who fled the fighting are being 
temporarily absorbed in bordering countries.  Likewise in Africa, ethnic conflict in the 
Great Lakes region and internal strife in West Africa have been shown to have a broader 
destabilizing impact.  Civil war in Sierra Leone drew in regional actors as Burkina Faso, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Libya supported different factions during the conflict.  The ripple 
                                                            
3 Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel.  The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative 
Approach.  New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 607.   
4 William R. Thompson.  “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explanation and a 
Propositional Inventory.”  International Studies Quarterly, 17, 1 (March 1973): 93. 
5 When reference is made toward parts and units, we are not just referring to states.  Additional 
components of the Middle East and African sub-systems include leaders, movements, regional 
organizations, and a range of other non-state actors that comprise the whole at the sub-regional level.  
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effect of the Rwandan Genocide led to Tutsi rebels invading the country from Uganda, a 
mass exodus of Hutus to the neighboring Congo, Rwandan backed rebels temporarily 
taking over in Kinshasa, and the porous borders surrounding the Congo allowing militant 
groups to operate with impunity.   
In terms of economic integration, even with conflict, instability, and sanctions, 
trade continues to transpire between sub-systemic actors.  Commerce, in some cases, has 
flourished as a result of these conditions that usually debilitate economic interactions as 
lucrative black markets have developed to provide goods and service that are otherwise 
unavailable.  Common cultural norms, religious values, ethnic identity, ideological 
affiliations, overlapping linguistic associations, similar regime type, and shared historical 
experiences all constitute affiliations that help further integrate the various components 
within the overall systems of the Middle East and Africa.   
 
The Middle East and Africa: Modernization and Historical Paths to the Present 
The primary focus of this dissertation is to explain the determinants of outflows of 
Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa.  Nevertheless, it is essential to build upon 
previous sections that define and conceptualize the region and continent by providing the 
necessary background to ensure that the treatment of the topic is placed in its proper 
historical context. 
The politics of both regions have been marred by violence, authoritarianism, and 
foreign domination.  These characteristics are not unique to the Middle East and Africa 
and can be seen, in one way or another, throughout the Third World during the colonial 
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era and the subsequent post-WWII decolonization period.6  Armed resistance campaigns 
were an important component in the struggle for many of these nations to acquire 
independence and the regimes that succeeded colonial occupation were mainly 
authoritarian in nature.  In addition, after the yoke of colonialism had been officially 
thrown off, a large number of neo-colonial states dominated by foreign powers emerged 
throughout the Global South with ruling elites closely aligning themselves with outside 
forces. 
No two areas of the world have experienced as much foreign intervention as the 
Middle East and Africa in the modern era.  One of the first instances of heavy external 
interference from the West was Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt in 1798, but western 
intrusion greatly intensified in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  The “Scramble for 
Africa” led to the official partition and formal colonization of the continent by European 
powers following the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the Berlin Conference of 
1884-1885.  After the end of WWI and the subsequent breakup of the Ottoman Empire, 
Britain and France, via the Sykes-Picot Agreement, divided up most of the Middle East 
into mandates, which were little more than fig leaves for colonial rule.7  Western powers 
even managed to dominate countries that were not formally under their suzerainty.  For 
example, Iran was politically dominated by Britain and Russia throughout the early 20th 
century, and later fell under the hegemony of the United States until 1979.  Due to a 
military invasion and subsequent occupation, fiercely independent Ethiopia even fell 
under the brief control of Italy in the 1930s. 
                                                            
 6 The terms developing world, global south, and third world will be used interchangeably.   
7 These mandates are also occasionally referred to as protectorates.  
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Initially, the discovery of an abundant amount of natural resources and raw 
materials, which were relatively inexpensive to produce, sparked western interest in the 
region.  The procurement of petroleum in the Middle East allowed the British military to 
switch its primary source of fuel from coal to oil.  This change was strategically vital for 
Britain’s navy during WWI, because it allowed its ships to sail faster and for longer 
durations.  Since the Middle East has the largest amount of proven oil reserves in the 
world, the struggle over controlling access to this natural resource has led to tremendous 
amounts of foreign intervention and destabilization that still continues to this day. 
Likewise in Africa, WWI caused a precipitous increase in demand for copper, 
which was readily available in different parts of the continent.  Therefore, mass 
production of the metal for wires, cables, and manufacturing purposes played a crucial 
role in the war efforts of the Allied Powers.  The US government was also particularly 
dependent, along with most of the world, on uranium from central Africa.8  The United 
States, which had already utilized uranium excavated from the Congo in the two atomic 
bombs it had dropped on Japan at the end of WWII, was in desperate need of a stable, 
unfettered supply of the ore, because of the nuclear arms race it was embarking on with 
the Soviet Union.  Due to Africa possessing the most vast and diverse amount of natural 
resources on the planet, competition over the continent’s inherent wealth has been a key 
source of conflict, instability, and foreign encroachment.9   
                                                            
 8 At this time the Congo was the source of the majority of the world’s uranium and the ore was 
most abundant in the province of Katanga. 
9 This is one element of the resource curse.  For a comprehensive discussion on the issue, see 
Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Editors.  Escaping the Resource Curse.  
New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. 
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As WWII ended, the trend of increased nationalist sentiment grew throughout the 
Global South, which helped usher in the end of colonialism.  The international roles of 
Britain and France had been diminished while the US attempted, with varying degrees of 
success, to fill the Western European void by becoming the main power broker in the 
Middle East and Africa.  In addition to the acquisition of independence by former 
colonies, American and Soviet super-power rivalry was being simultaneously solidified 
through the Cold War.  The establishment of Mao Tse-Tung’s People’s Republic of 
China in 1949 and the Korean War (1950-1953) exacerbated US fears of communism.  
As a consequence, the United States began to increasingly view foreign policy and 
international developments through the lens of Cold War politics.  American officials 
believed that third world nationalism was synonymous with chaos, which would lead to a 
potential communist takeover, thus, a pro-western autocratic or “strong man” was 
preferred for reasons of stability.10   
As a result of the Cold War and the strategic significance of natural resources, 
many of the regimes that emerged in the Middle East and Africa were highly 
authoritarian and dictatorial in nature.  A number of these neo-colonial states were 
actively supported and heavily influenced by the United States.  In turn, when making 
policy calculations, these autocratic rulers would, for the most part, safeguard American 
interests and work to secure western access to ores, metals, and fossil fuels.  Furthermore, 
due to a lack of development, these same governments in the region and continent 
became increasingly dependent on the West not just for political support, but for 
financial, economic, and military aid.  The low level of progress in the Middle East and 
                                                            
10 This phenomenon was not specific to only the Middle East and Africa.  It was evident in other 
parts of the Developing World, such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, as well.  
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Africa coupled with dependency on the West also meant that raw materials would be 
exported out while finished goods were imported back into these two parts of the world.11  
The West fostered this relationship by encouraging authoritarian governments in both 
places to purchase vast quantities of services, technology, and military equipment that 
they sometimes did not necessarily need, or even, in some cases, know how to use.12  As 
relations grew stronger, so did the accompanying dependency.13  The bond has become 
so robust that the American-allied authoritarian leadership of these regions has been 
given carte blanche domestically as long as the relationship remains intact and the status 
quo is maintained.14  In general, these authoritarian states may be characterized by their 
secularism, oppressive politics, relative lack of development, and the tendency to use 
religious symbolism and nationalist imagery when politically expedient.  
                                                            
11 A good historical example of this relationship of dependency would be Egypt exporting cotton 
to Britain and later buying finished British goods, such as clothing, that used Egyptian cotton. 
12 Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms have relatively recently purchased very 
sophisticated military equipment from the US.  America actively encourages these states to buy these goods 
by highlighting Iraqi and Iranian “threats” to the security of their regimes.  As one former member of the 
US military has told me, ex-military personnel have developed quite a lucrative career by traveling to these 
countries and attempting to teach members of their armed forces to use this new equipment.  In some cases, 
such as the AWACs surveillance planes sold to the Saudi military, Americans have had to assume the duty 
of flying them and monitoring the skies themselves.     
13 For example, the dependency on the US in Kuwait is so strong that America is, for the most 
part, solely responsible for the security of Kuwaitis.  The government of Kuwait pays the United States to 
operate a military base in the country as well.  Similarly, without American support, most experts agree that 
the Saudi monarchy would be much more susceptible to pressure and destabilization.  The United States 
and France both also have a military presence in the Horn of Africa and the latter has a network of small, 
but well-equipped military bases in Djibouti, Senegal, and Gabon.     
14 Fairly representative recent cases that personify this relationship include the violent state 
suppression of protestors in Gabon in 2009 and Bahrain beginning in 2011.  In both instances the 
aggressive measures taken did not act as an impediment to continued political, economic, and military 
cooperation with the United States.     
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To fully understand the evolution of Middle Eastern and African politics, it is 
necessary to go beyond simply analyzing western impact by broadening our focus and 
examining some of the paths taken toward modernization and the role these programs 
played in bringing about the situation that is currently unfolding in both the region and 
continent.  As previously described, the Middle East and Africa are notorious for low 
levels of development which intensify dependency on outside forces.  There have, 
however, been modernization attempts, though in some cases these developmental 
models conflated being modern with westernization while others programs rejected 
western values.  In general, the mode of modernization utilized by Middle Eastern and 
African regimes has been a top-down form of development that is highly bureaucratic 
and extremely authoritarian with the intent of ensuring regime continuity.  
The most notable examples of the phenomenon in the Middle East are Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah’s modernization efforts in Turkey and Iran.  Both leaders 
came from a military background and were staunchly secular, highly dictatorial, and 
worked to emulate the West.  The plans they had for modernizing their countries ranged 
from establishing a state with central authority and a strong military to banning 
traditional Middle Eastern clothing in favor of western attire.15  The results for both 
nations have been mixed.16  On the one hand, law and order was established, modern 
amenities became more common, and a renewed sense of national pride was created.  On 
                                                            
15 Ataturk was more extreme in his revamping of Turkey as he even changed the alphabet from 
Arabic letters to a Latin variant.  Reza Shah’s modernization program was continued by his son, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.  
16 For a summary of the differences in terms of strategy and outcomes between the 
Kemalist state in Turkey and Iran under the Pahlavis, see William Cleveland and Martin Bunton.  
A History of the Modern Middle East.  Boulder: Westview Press, 2012, Chapter 10.  
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the other hand, the role of the military as the “protectors” of Turkish democracy led to 
four military coups and the Pahlavi monarchy’s corruption and economic 
mismanagement helped lead to its downfall. 
An interesting contemporary case is Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  
This sheikhdom has used the vast increase in petrodollars to develop the area as a whole 
and to attempt to diversify its economy.17  These advancements have transformed Dubai 
into an important international financial center, popular tourist destination, and 
precipitated a real estate boom.  Although the Persian Gulf monarchies, with the 
exception of Bahrain, have been largely immune to the recent political turmoil in the 
region, real governmental reforms have not been undertaken.18  Instead, most of these 
states have made a conscious decision to try and adapt to modern demands by making a 
few piecemeal political changes and increasing already generous government subsidies as 
a way to pre-empt any sort of societal discontent.  Therefore, despite these recent 
changes, the UAE ultimately remains a welfare state, and even with a small population, 
questions remain on the sustainability of this approach, which means the end result of this 
modernization campaign is unclear.   
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is emblematic of the problems that 
have plagued the continent of Africa and frustrated attempts at modernization.  Shortly 
after the end of Belgian colonialism, a power struggle between various political actors led 
                                                            
17 See James Bill and Robert Springborg.  Politics in the Middle East.  London: Pearson, 1999, 
Chapter 9.  
18 Bahrain is a unique case in that a minority Sunni family rules over a majority Shia population.  
Also, the public revelations made by Saudi Prince Khaled Bin Farhan al-Saud as a result of his recent 
defection suggest that the government of Saudi Arabia is highly concerned over the revolts in the Arab 
world and has taken a proactively aggressive approach in cracking down on dissent.   
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to General Joseph Mobutu conducting his second coup in November 1965 and 
establishing a military dictatorship for the next five years.  After systematically 
eliminating political opponents, Mobutu, having no real challenges or obstacles 
remaining in his path, personally ruled the Congo for virtually the next 30 years.  The 
defining characteristics of Mobutu’s rule, as Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja puts it, were 
“…corruption, gross violations of human rights, including assassinations, extrajudicial 
executions, massacres of unarmed civilians, and banishment to remote penal colonies.”19 
Mobutu, having become president for life through a single-party system, began to 
implement his own distorted version of modernization along with ideologies of 
authenticity or Mobutuism and “Zairianization” to try and develop the Congo and garner 
support from the masses.  The manifesto of Mobutu’s political party speaks for itself: 
[It aims]…to build a truly independent Congo, to adopt nationalism as its 
doctrine, to restore the authority of the state and its international prestige, to give 
priority to the economy…by achieving a sound financial situation, stable 
currency, and controlled economy.20 
 
Authenticity, however, meant unilaterally changing the name of the country to Zaire, 
banning foreign or Christian names, and not permitting men or women to wear western 
style clothing.21  To calm capitalist fears, Mobutu utilized the term “Zairianization” as a 
code word for nationalization.  This policy involved expropriating many foreign owned 
companies, taking over the insurance field, organizing a new shipping agency, and 
                                                            
 19 Nzongola-Ntalaja, p. 141.   
 20 Thomas Kanza.  The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in the Congo.  Cambridge: 
Schenkman Publishing Group Company, 1979, p. 353.   
21 Nzongola-Ntalaja, p. 172.        
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creating a state-controlled contractor group.22  Mobutu’s political philosophy did not 
succeed in developing the Congo nor did it generate the public support that was expected.   
Ultimately, Mobutu was overthrown during the First Congo War from 1996 to 
1997 by rebel forces backed by Uganda and Rwanda.  Subsequently, the Second Congo 
War from 1998 to 2003, where states intervened in support of and opposition to the 
Congolese government, and the Kivu Conflict, which was a spillover conflict in eastern 
Congo from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, have led to over five million people dying as a 
result of war, disease, and starvation and millions more suffering displacement.  In the 
aftermath of violence, a semblance of normality has returned to the DRC and although 
the Congo is now nominally democratic, it still faces the same challenges it did over 50 
years ago.23   
For many years autocratic leaders in the Middle East and Africa were able to 
manage and contain popular discontent through a combination of coercion and 
cooptation.  Yet decades of autocracy, patrimonialism, corruption, economic inefficiency, 
high unemployment, minimal political freedom, and human rights violations converged 
in recent times to create movements for change across the region and continent.  Both the 
Arab Spring and the mini-wave of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa have forced leaders 
                                                            
 22 Kanza, p. 354 and Nzongola-Ntalaja, p. 274.       
23 Although Belgian colonial occupation of the Congo was extremely brutal and fell just short of 
the official definition of genocide, the challenges and opportunities facing the DRC mirror many of the 
same issues confronting African countries across the continent.  Similar to the Congo, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, and other African states have all made the post-conflict transition from 
institutionalized autocracy to nascent democracy.  For a detailed account of the interrelated causes of 
unnatural death in the Congo during the colonial era, see Adam Hochschild.  King Leopold’s Ghost: A 
Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa.  Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1998, pp. 225-234.  
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to confront the pervasive political and socio-economic shortcomings that ultimately gave 
rise to multiple public expressions of grievances. 
The political demands that brought about change in the Middle East and Africa 
have had their limitations.  Despite challenges to political authority and incremental 
changes in the region, most regimes in the Middle East were able to adapt, and the 
underlying tensions mentioned above that are endemic in most societies remain in place.  
In Africa, although transitions to democracy have taken place in some states, 
authoritarianism continues in others.  Even in nascent democracies, consolidating 
democratic rule has been extremely challenging as states continue to confront problems, 
ranging from authoritarian tendencies to bloated bureaucracies to instability and conflict, 
that have plagued Africa in the past.  
 
Review of the Literature (II): Theory and Research on Chinese Foreign Direct Investment 
Overview: Development, Patterns, and Trends in Chinese Outward FDI 
The purpose of the following sections of the paper is to gauge the state of 
scholarship and level of intellectual production on the issue of Chinese foreign direct 
investment.  As we survey the literature on the topic, there will be an expansion of some 
of the sources cited previously while also introducing new secondary material to fully 
round out our discussion in a thematic manner.  In doing so, we will weave and 
intertwine theory and hypotheses with our literature review in order to flesh out our 
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sources and offer a thorough understanding of the academic scholarship on Chinese 
FDI.24 
Hsiu-Ling Wu and Chien-Hsun Chen identify four stages in the development of 
Chinese FDI from 1978 to 2001.25  The 1st stage (1978-1983) was based primarily on 
policy objectives: China sought to use outward bound FDI as a means to enhance 
cooperation with states in order to establish trade relationships and bolster Beijing’s 
economic clout and political status at the international level.  Profit maximization was not 
a key goal at this stage.  During the 2nd stage (1984-1985), the numbers, scope, and range 
of Chinese enterprises involved in external FDI activities increased rapidly.  This trend 
continued in the 3rd stage (1986-1992) as a result of economic liberalization and 
government encouragement.  In this era, profit maximization became important as 
Chinese firms attempted to exploit their comparative advantage in various sectors.  The 
4th stage (1993-2001) witnessed some stagnation in the levels of outward FDI as the 
Chinese government implemented economic restructuring measures.  Overall, Wu and 
Chen are able to demonstrate that higher levels of international investment by Chinese 
companies continued despite occasional lags. 
The authors also echo other scholars in reiterating that seeking assets and 
resources were the primary reasons for large investments by Chinese firms in 
industrialized countries.  Nevertheless, another motivating factor for Chinese firms to 
                                                            
24 This portion along with subsequent sections of the literature review will be organized 
thematically.  Overlap, however, is unavoidable as various issues within Chinese FDI converge and 
coincide with one another.   
25 See Hsiu-Ling Wu and Chien-Hsun Chen.  “An Assessment of Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment from China’s Transitional Economy.”  Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 8 (December 2001): 1235-
1254.   
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invest overseas is highlighted.  An argument is made that offshore investments may be 
able to offer protection against domestic inflation and exchange rate depreciation.  
Therefore, Chinese MNCs can set up subsidiaries internationally to enjoy the benefits of 
a more balanced portfolio and evade foreign exchange and other restrictions that would 
hamper them in China.  The article additionally underscores the move by Chinese 
companies to begin diversifying the geographic distribution of their overseas investment 
activities during this time period by turning their attention to other areas. 
Mark Yaolin Wang traces the history and explains the motivations behind 
outward Chinese FDI in a relatively early journal article on the subject.26  Wang focuses 
on the selection of locations during the nascent stages of Chinese FDI.  Initially, China 
mainly targeted the US, Canada, Australia, and Hong Kong with FDI outflows with the 
strategic logic behind these investments being similar to the reasons put forth by Wu and 
Chen.  The year 1990 is identified as being the time when China began outward FDI in 
increasingly larger amounts to other parts of the world (Africa, the European Union, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East).  This pattern 
would pick up pace in the 1990s and subsequently expand even further during the first 
decade of the new century. 
Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and Minyuan Zhao describe China’s outward 
FDI in terms of its size, scope, target locations, and players.27  The authors tell us that 
China’s global share of outward FDI is extremely small.  While there has been attention 
                                                            
26 See Mark Yaolin Wang.  “The Motivations behind China’s Government-Initiated Industrial 
Investments Overseas.”  Pacific Affairs, 75, 2 (Summer 2002): 187-206.   
27 See Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and Minyuan Zhao.  “Perspectives on China’s outward 
foreign direct investment.”  Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 3 (April 2008): 337-350. 
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directed toward high profile Chinese FDI in developed countries, the target locations for 
most of the country’s FDI and FDI stock, as of the end of 2006, are in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America.  Moreover, the article’s data also shows a propensity for Chinese firms to 
invest in Caribbean tax havens for a multitude of potential reasons (concealing wealth 
from the government, hiding profits from shareholders, and easy access to trade and 
finance activities).  Examining the 30 largest companies in China in 2005 and 2006, the 
article discusses two major observations vis-à-vis these key players.  First, the biggest 
sources of outward FDI are state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  Second, practically all the 
important corporate actors in relation to Chinese FDI have domestic monopolies in some 
major industry.    
Suma Athreye and Sandeep Kapur provide the reader with a contemporary 
introduction and broad overview of the trends, motivations, and strategies of Chinese and 
Indian firms as they expand internationally as well as policy implications resulting from 
this global expansion.28  Focusing on China, the authors chronicle the rapid rise of 
outward FDI from the Developing World in general and China in particular, and state that 
Chinese firms are increasingly involved in overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  
Subsequently, the article explains that Chinese FDI is more often in primary sectors, 
especially minerals and energy, whereas international investment from India is spread out 
across a number of sectors.  The authors argue that the trend of Chinese economic 
dependence on sustained exports is the driving factor forcing Chinese FDI to seek and 
secure access to natural resources and raw materials. 
                                                            
  28 See Athreye and Kapur, 2009. 
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Athreye and Kapur contend that a permissive economy is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for overseas investment when describing Chinese motivations.  The 
two authors then argue that existing theoretical perspectives, such as the OLI paradigm, 
fall short of explaining the international activities of MNCs from developing countries.  
In particular, they claim that traditional theories on economic development do not apply 
to China’s FDI patterns since the country leapfrogged some of these stages by utilizing 
import substitution to develop their industrial base. 
The article concludes by discussing possible policy implications and broader 
international and domestic trends.  The authors believe that most view China’s ability to 
provide low cost manufactured goods to consumers as a positive, but they also point to 
anxiety over China’s overall rise by the “established order of industrial hegemony.”29  In 
relation to the domestic layer, the piece puts forth two contending views.  One is that 
increased levels of FDI will deprive the home country of both financial and human 
capital.  The second school of thought views the increased internationalization of 
developing economies as their “coming of age.”30 
 
The Role of the State in Chinese FDI: Theory, Practice, and Hypotheses 
Prior scholarship in the fields of international political economy and international 
business has often relied upon the OLI model, or “eclectic” paradigm, to investigate the 
cross-national pattern of direct investment.31  The OLI theory emphasizes that firms are 
                                                            
29 Ibid., p. 219.    
30 Ibid., p. 220.  
31 As mentioned in the previous chapter, OLI refers to ownership advantages (O), location 
advantages (L), and internalization (I).  The paradigm is referred to as “eclectic” because it blends together 
elements from the neo-classical theory of the firm and other behavioral approaches.  For a pioneering 
32 
 
likely to internationalize (as opposed to remaining focused on the domestic market) when 
they enjoy an ownership advantage over potential competitors in foreign markets.32  
Typically, scholars employing the OLI framework often ignore the role of the state (in 
the home economy) in FDI behavior, and particularly in studies of US FDI.  Yet, in 
recent times, some studies have argued for the need to shift the focus from firm behavior 
in advanced states in order to explain the outward investment behavior of Chinese firms, 
which are based in a newly industrialized economy.33  Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, 
however, in the Chinese context outward FDI must receive the approval of various 
government ministries, which invites attention to the role of the state in guiding FDI. 
The political regime in China is a one party state.  Emphasis on the PRC’s role in 
the economic dimensions of foreign policy is reflective of a broader state-centered 
approach in dictating a country’s political economy, especially in East Asian 
developmental states.  And China can be considered a developmental state in the sense 
that it is industrializing while simultaneously possessing the bureaucratic and regulatory 
capacity to influence outward FDI amongst state-owned and private firms.34  The PRC is 
also not a liberal regime that allows its firms a tremendous amount of economic freedom.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
discussion on the OLI framework, see John H. Dunning.  Explaining International Production.  London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1988.  For a critique of the OLI model, see Edward Graham.  “The (Not Wholly 
Satisfactory) State of the Theory of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Enterprise.”  Paper 
presented to the Conference at the Cento Interdipartimentale di Economia Internazionale (CIDEI), 
University of Rome, Italy, October 27-28, 1994. 
32 See Richard E. Caves.  Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982 and John H. Dunning.  “Reappraising the Eclectic Paradigm in an Age 
of Alliance Capitalism.”  Journal of International Business Studies, 26, 3 (Third Quarter 1995): 461-491.  
33 John H. Dunning and Rajneesh Narula.  Foreign Direct Investment and Governments: Catalysts 
for Economic Restructuring.  New York: Taylor and Francis, 1998, pp. 379-420.  
34 Brazil would be another contemporary example of a developmental state.  
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As Ping Deng notes, state ministries, such as the State Administration for Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE), have various policy instruments at their disposal to influence FDI 
decisions.35  Reflecting the consensus at high levels of policy-making, state officials seek 
to employ outward FDI to safeguard national interests, including energy security, or to 
promote domestic competitiveness through the acquisition of foreign technology with 
FDI.36  Chinese multi-national corporations realize the constraints of the political 
environment in which they operate and are sensitive to state security concerns and 
strategic economic interests.  In addition to national expansion, the business climate in 
China has helped to establish closer relations between private sector actors and those in 
the public sphere.  This allows Beijing to either play the role of FDI facilitator, if MNCs 
cooperate by accounting for state needs in their commercial endeavors, or strictly enforce 
regulatory measures for firms who do not.   
Wang also states that the Chinese government has actively supported and 
sponsored this process by playing a crucial role in directing large corporations to invest in 
certain locations and particular sectors abroad.37  The PRC has taken this approach in 
order to have outward Chinese FDI carried out in accordance with China’s long-term 
strategic interests.  Thus, Beijing has encouraged its large firms to seek and acquire 
strategic resources (capital, raw materials, technology, and information) in order to 
ensure continued growth.  Beyond the PRC’s push for large enterprises to go overseas in 
order to secure steady supplies of resources, Chinese firms have also sought new markets 
                                                            
35 Ping Deng, 2007, p. 72. 
36 See Tuman and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015), Dunning and Narula, 1998, and Athreye and 
Kapur, 2009.   
37 See Wang, 2002.  
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for their products.  Acquiring access to new technology via joint ventures has been 
another motivating factor in Chinese companies going abroad.  Wang describes the 
formal process of engaging in outward FDI and the official mechanisms and systems in 
place by the government to help implement and monitor these external Chinese FDI 
activities as well. 
Athreye and Kapur demonstrate that much of the outward investment in the 
Chinese context is done by large SOEs, which serves to directly solidify the role of the 
state in this process.38  However, the authors, similar to other scholars, observe that 
Chinese FDI is still small in scale when compared to the size of its economy and 
international FDI flows.  Thus, the attention that Chinese overseas investments are 
receiving is a result of China’s status as an emerging global power and the Beijing-led 
reorientation of its economy from an inward perspective to an outward approach. 
In general terms, they believe the aforementioned commercial activities by 
Chinese firms reflect attempts to follow Beijing’s lead by procuring strategic assets and 
obtaining access to raw materials and distribution networks.  Another motive identified 
by the two is the need to gain access or proximity to overseas markets.  In China’s case 
this would be to improve access that has already been acquired through exports.  The 
second motivating factor Athreye and Kapur highlight is the drive to secure access to 
natural resources and raw materials in order to sustain continued economic growth.  In 
this area, Chinese state-owned corporations have been at the forefront of obtaining access 
to these resources.  The article cites a possible rush overseas in order to get ahead of 
domestic rivals as well. 
                                                            
38 See Athreye and Kapur, 2009.  More information on this aspect of Chinese FDI will be provided 
below in the section on economic influences.  
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Ping Deng contends that when it comes to outward investment flows, the drive for 
assets is spurred by the state and based on strategic needs, especially competing 
successfully in international markets.39  He is explicitly examining the rationale behind 
resource driven mergers and acquisitions by Chinese MNCs using theory and providing 
evidence in the form of case studies.  The article uses an institutional perspective to 
explain the overseas activities of Chinese firms, particularly their aggressive strategic 
asset-seeking M&A approach to FDI, which often times takes place in advanced 
countries.   
Deng’s model suggests that Chinese firms are under institutional pressures and 
cultural-cognitive influences to adopt the asset-seeking M&A strategy.  The research 
advances the idea that the Chinese government’s role in encouraging and facilitating 
outward FDI is the most important exogenous source of institutional pressure.  He also 
demonstrates that institutional constraints at the domestic level and rising difficulty in the 
ability to develop distinctive capabilities at home can contribute to M&A abroad and 
other forms of Chinese FDI.  Corporate values and norms are identified as important 
endogenous sources of institutional pressure as well.  Thus, the author concludes that 
higher levels of entrepreneurial orientation and adoption of the government’s “going 
global” outlook will boost the acquisition of strategic assets by Chinese firms in 
international expansion.  Deng ends by asserting that inward FDI can play a role in this 
process by acting as a stimulant in precipitating the acquisition of strategic assets when it 
comes to moving outward. 
 
                                                            
39 See Ping Deng.  “Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets in international 
expansion?”  Journal of World Business, 44, 1 (January 2009): 74-84. 
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Economic Influences on Chinese FDI: Theory, Practice, and Hypotheses 
As observed above, a number of scholars hypothesize that the Chinese state 
guides firms, including SOEs and private companies, to promote certain national 
economic goals and interests.  Certainly, countries that possess strategically important 
natural resources might be important for Chinese FDI.  Harry Broadman, for example, 
hypothesizes that a large part of recent Chinese FDI targets oil-rich countries.  This 
strategy has been facilitated by the Chinese state’s “going global” policy, in which firms 
are guided to “invest abroad to seek inputs in support of the country’s fast-paced 
economic development…”40  Citing the recent geographical diversification of Chinese 
FDI, Wu and Chen and later Wang posit that Chinese firms have been motivated to invest 
in developing countries to secure access to oil and other important resources.41  Prior 
research has also found a positive association between inflows of Chinese FDI and 
natural resources in the host country.42 
Chinese firms may have an inclination to be market-oriented as well.  The state-
centered framework on Chinese FDI hypothesizes that market-oriented firms may use 
trade as a precursor to FDI.  Trade allows a firm to establish a presence in the host 
country’s market and to gauge additional market potential.  If sales from prior trade are 
robust, firms may establish a branch in the market through FDI.  Some studies have 
                                                            
40 Harry G. Broadman.  Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier.  
Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007, p. 90. 
41 See Wu and Chen, 2001 and Wang, 2002.  Wu and Chen cite the primacy of economic 
influences, particularly the desire to seek new markets and increase exports, as being the initial triggers of 
Chinese FDI. 
42 See Buckley et al., 2007, Ping Deng, 2007, and Ping Deng, 2009. 
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found a positive link between trade and Chinese FDI.43  Similarly, if firms are interested 
in higher sales, host countries with higher levels of per capita income might be attractive 
to Chinese FDI, and particularly for higher value-added products.44  However, Chinese 
firms might also gravitate to economies with lower incomes because there are fewer 
competitors from advanced states, and because there might be potential for strong growth 
for lower value-added products. 
Huaichuan Rui and George S. Yip divide up the foreign investment habits of 
Chinese firms into separate categories and subcategories.45  The first group consists of 
large SOEs concerned with acquiring natural resources.  Within these state-owned firms, 
according to the authors, there exists an “…obligation to fulfill national tasks with cost 
the least of considerations.”46  The second is made up of large SOEs motivated by 
China’s “go out” or “go global” policy.  The third category is large or small public firms 
serving corporate strategy and shareholder interests.  The last set of actors is private 
corporations that are driven by corporate strategy and entrepreneurial ambitions.   
The further division of these Chinese MNCs is based on the underlying reasons 
for their acquisition activities.  One group is made up of MNCs with a focus on being 
                                                            
43 See Broadman, 2007 and Edward K.Y. Chen and Ping Lin.  “Emerging transnational 
corporations from East Asia: the case of mainland China.”  in Juan J. Palacios, Editor, Multinational 
Corporations and the Emerging Network Economy in Asia and the Pacific.  London: Routledge, 2008, pp 
183-207. 
44 See Chen and Lin, 2008.  They speculate that Chinese firms may be motivated to invest in more 
mature developing-country markets in order to acquire new technology and managerial skills, which can be 
transferred back to China. 
45 See Huaichuan Rui and George S. Yip.  “Foreign acquisitions by Chinese firms: A strategic 
intent perspective.”  Journal of World Business, 43, 2 (March 2008): 213-226.  
46 Ibid., p. 213. 
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competitive on a global scale while still wanting to retain strong positions domestically 
(e.g., Lenovo, Haier, and Huawei).  Another motivating factor for Chinese MNCs is the 
need to offset competitive weakness in order to transform themselves (this has been an 
acquisition strategy used by SOEs).  An additional driving force is competition between 
Chinese firms with a primarily domestic orientation and foreign MNCs for shares in the 
Chinese market.  These domestic firms go out and pursue strategic assets internationally 
to either remain competitive or compensate for shortcomings within China.  Trade-
oriented firms also seek strategic assets from abroad to expand trade in the short term 
while possibly reinventing themselves as production firms later on down the road.  The 
last are niche market players who engage in foreign acquisition as a means to further 
enhance their position in the market.  The research is supported by case studies from 
three Chinese corporations (Lenovo, Huawei, and Nanjing Automotive) who all 
displayed a strategic intent perspective when making acquisition decisions in line with 
the motivations mentioned above. 
Morck et al. identify three features at the macroeconomic level that are associated 
with increases in Chinese FDI: a high savings rate, weak corporate governance, and 
distorted capital allocation.  Subsequently, the authors turn to the theory of the firm and 
the microeconomic motivations of Chinese outward investment activities.  They believe 
that Chinese SOEs have developed robust methods of operation despite state interference.  
Additionally, the article argues that navigating in this type of difficult institutional 
atmosphere has aided Chinese MNCs when operating in countries with similar 
institutional environments.   
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Morck et al. contend that two remaining rationales guide outward Chinese FDI.  
The first is that:  
“…in certain maturing industries, outward FDI from China, even into advanced 
economies, might make economic sense. This ownership reversal…argues that 
the party possessing manufacturing capabilities becomes the ‘‘boss’’ as the locus 
of competition shifts from innovation to production cost and quality control.”47 
 
The second is that:  
“…China’s outward FDI may be justified economically to SOE insiders who 
overvalue control owing to their distrust of markets and sense of national pride. 
This…rationale can continue as long as those who control China’s business 
enterprises continue to accept below-market share valuations in exchange for 
these perceived benefits of control.”48 
 
Xinming Deng examines the top 500 Chinese firms from 2004 in order to explain 
why these companies have gone abroad.49  Specifically, the author is analyzing their 
motivations for internationalization, their entry mode choices in foreign markets, and the 
logic behind the international markets they target.  Only 59.64% of the Chinese 
corporations under investigation in this study end up having significant levels of outward 
FDI.  The main Chinese entities, within the time frame of the article, that operate 
internationally are primarily from the steel, telecommunications, and building materials 
and construction industries.  When analyzing the root causes behind Chinese firms going 
abroad, the author argues that it is chiefly a result of seeking both overseas markets and 
strategic assets.  Other reasons highlighted by Deng that explain outward Chinese FDI are 
                                                            
47 Morck et al., p. 348.  
48 Ibid.  
49 See Xinming Deng.  “Patterns of Internationalization of Chinese firms—Empirical Study Based 
on Strategic Approach.”  Journal of Public Affairs, 9, 4 (November 2009): 301-312.  
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efficiency seeking, eliminating institutional obstacles, gaining institutional benefits, 
industrial promotion, and seeking resources. 
The article elaborates by telling the reader that Chinese firms have utilized a 
multitude of methods with respect to their mode of entry into foreign markets.  They 
range from direct export (the most popular entry mode) to management contracts (the 
least popular entry mode).  The others, from least popular to most, include original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM), franchising, strategic alliances, transnational export of 
labor services, license, the creation of wholly-owned firms, construction of overseas 
factories, erecting research and development institutions, overseas technical cooperation, 
mergers and acquisitions, engineer contracting, joint ventures, listing abroad, indirect 
export, and overseas sale subsidiaries establishment.  The author’s analysis reveals that 
although much of Chinese FDI at the time was located in Southeast Asia, the US, and 
Europe Union, there were large chunks of external investment in Russia, the Middle East, 
and Africa.  Deng believes that these Chinese firms are conducting a “multi-directional 
exploration of international markets and international resources.”50 
Peter J. Buckley, L. Jeremy Clegg, Adam R. Cross, Xin Liu, Hinrich Voss, and 
Ping Zheng conduct a quantitative analysis using information from a variety of sources 
including data from the State Administration for Foreign Exchange, a key Chinese 
government agency that deals with the investment approval process.51  Their findings are 
consistent with some of their hypotheses while not lending support to some of their other 
assertions.  Their data indicates that Chinese outward direct investment (ODI) is 
                                                            
50 Ibid., p. 310.  
51 See Buckley et al., 2007. 
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associated positively with absolute host market size (prior to 1991).52  In particular, 
market seeking was a key motive for this aforementioned hypothesis.  The authors also 
found that Chinese FDI is associated positively with the proportion of ethnic Chinese in 
the host population.  Therefore, cultural proximity is found to have a highly significant 
and positive effect on Chinese FDI flows.  Their research also suggests that liberalization 
of Chinese FDI policy in 1992 increased external investment for that year.  Their 
quantitative analysis of Chinese ODI patterns did not demonstrate a positive association 
between overseas investment by China and host country endowments of natural resources 
(although this did become significant from 1992 onwards) nor was Chinese ODI 
associated positively with host country endowments of ownership advantages.   
They continue by elaborating on differences across time vis-à-vis the 
determinants of Chinese FDI.  Before 1991, inflation, geographic distance, and market 
openness were key determinants of outward direct investment, but post-1992 only exports 
and imports are significant.  As a result, Chinese FDI patterns have changed over time, 
and the article argues that change has partially occurred as a result of policy liberalization 
within China.  Buckley et al. also find that from 1984-2001 Chinese firms moved away 
from undertaking mainly market-seeking strategies in nearby foreign markets and toward 
the securing of raw materials in riskier markets.  Therefore, securing natural resources 
has become a vital goal in recent years in order to meet the demands of domestic growth.  
These investments have been made in countries, at least by western standards, with 
higher levels of political risk.  Another important conclusion in the article is that market 
                                                            
52 Buckley et al. utilize the term ODI as opposed to FDI throughout their article.  Since there is no 
substantive difference between the two terms, the use of one over the other is a matter of style and 
preference.  
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size is a significant determinant of Chinese FDI within countries part of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  However, the authors find that 
Chinese FDI follows trade/exports in both OECD and non-OECD countries.  Mergers 
and asset-seeking were not the driving forces behind Chinese FDI flows.  This became an 
important strategy for Chinese firms following 2001 (the cutoff year for the article’s 
data).  One last indicator of external FDI cited by Buckley et al. is that capital market 
imperfections, particularly the low cost of capital that firms (especially SOEs) enjoy, in 
China have been crucial to outward FDI over the period in question (1984-2001). 
Ping Deng, relying on data from the late 1990s and early 2000s, asserts that 
Chinese MNCs invest more in developed countries due to better technology, managerial 
skills, and investment environment.53  He goes on to explain that Chinese FDI is 
characterized by two significant and distinct features: the critical role of the Chinese 
government and the increasing use of mergers and acquisitions as a mode of entry.54  
Both of these factors are highly influential in facilitating asset-seeking FDI based on the 
country’s strategic needs.   
Deng highlights five economic determinants of Chinese FDI from an earlier 2004 
article he authored: investing for natural resources, technology, markets, diversification, 
and strategic assets.  He then elaborates by analyzing the root causes of these motivations 
and providing evidence in the form of case studies.  The asset-seeking perspective (i.e., 
acquiring strategic resources such as market intelligence, technological know-how, 
management expertise, and a reputation for being established in a prestigious market) is 
                                                            
53 See Ping Deng, 2007. 
54 Deng’s discussion on the role of the state can be found in a more recent contribution he made to 
the literature on Chinese FDI above in the previous section.  
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used as the primary factor in understanding the behavior of Chinese firms investing 
overseas.  Specifically, the author cites China’s relatively late arrival on the international 
investment scene, which has provided impetus for Chinese MNCs to more aggressively 
engage in asset-seeking FDI, especially in developed countries, to compensate for 
competitive disadvantages and to allow for improvements in global competitiveness.  In 
addition to M&A, Chinese MNCs utilize Greenfield investments as their other preferred 
method of engaging in asset-seeking investments.   
In the edited volume Multinational Corporations and the Emerging Network 
Economy in Asia and the Pacific, a set of scholars tackle a wide-range of issues 
surrounding the political economy of the Far East.55  Edward K.Y. Chen and Ping Lin 
seek to identify the characteristics and determinants of the FDI patterns of Chinese firms.  
They argue that China’s outward FDI motives are based on seeking resources, markets, 
efficiency if possible (this is essentially when an MNC invests in other countries in order 
to improve its own productivity), and strategic-assets (done mainly in developed 
countries).   
Chen and Lin do mention that securing stable supplies of natural resources at 
Beijing’s behest are important, but not as essential as strategic asset-seeking in explaining 
why Chinese MNCs go abroad.  The main reason for this, according to the text, is 
because large amounts of inward FDI flows along with the penetration of Chinese 
markets by powerful foreign MNCs during the past two decades have put a tremendous 
amount of competitive pressure on Chinese firms.  They further explain that this pressure 
left Chinese firms with no choice but to go abroad and acquire strategic-assets such as 
                                                            
55 See Juan J. Palacios, Editor.  Multinational Corporations and the Emerging Network Economy 
in Asia and the Pacific.  Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008, Chapter 8.  
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brand names, advanced technology, and a reputation for being established in developed 
countries.56  The two sum up their argument by telling us that outward Chinese FDI is in 
large part a reaction to inward FDI, and this has been the incentive for acquiring 
advanced technology from abroad. 
Chen and Lin also make an important distinction between two main types of 
external Chinese FDI.  The first is outward FDI by SOEs mainly in the area of natural 
resources in order to sustain China’s economic growth.  The second is primarily market 
driven with the goal being to locate new international markets for Chinese exports and to 
acquire strategic-assets like those mentioned above to either remain competitive in the 
face of domestic pressure brought about by an influx of inward FDI or to complement 
China’s existing advantages in low-cost manufacturing and increase its competitiveness 
at home and abroad.  Although efficiency seeking does not seem to be as important as the 
other aspects when it comes to Chinese FDI due to China’s abundance of low cost labor, 
the authors do support their assertions by using qualitative evidence in the form of case 
studies.          
While the text China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for 
Latin America and the United States does not primarily focus on the regions under 
consideration in this dissertation, portions of this edited volume are relevant to our 
discussion and may help shed light on the potential impact and policy implications of 
China’s new political and economic relationship with the Developing World.57  The book 
presents one claim that China’s growing international presence is simply a byproduct of 
                                                            
56 Chen and Lin, p. 184.   
57 Riordan Roett and Guadalupe Paz, Editors.  China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: 
Implications for Latin America and the United States.  Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.   
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the country’s “going global” strategy and then offers up counterclaims that emphasize 
China’s aggressive diplomatic approach in addressing fears that its rising power could 
potentially be destabilizing.  The text, when explaining the Chinese government’s 
economic policies, cites factors such as long-term strategic planning and goal setting, 
prioritizing the development of local capacity, sound fundamentals (competitive 
exchange rates, high savings and investment rates, education, and research), and a strong 
willingness by the state to intervene in economic affairs as all playing key roles in 
economic success in China. 
 
Foreign Policy Objectives and Political Influences on Chinese FDI: Theory, Practice, 
and Hypotheses 
In addition to economic influences, the state-centered theory of Chinese FDI 
hypothesizes that political conditions in the host country may have an effect on 
investment flows.  In particular, the state-centered approach assumes that firms gravitate 
to environments that provide secure protections for the firm’s ownership rights.58  In 
addition, state foreign policy goals and political considerations are crucial in the decision-
making process of Chinese firms to invest abroad.  As many analysts have indicated, 
Beijing already places a high degree of value on domestic political stability and 
incremental change.  Given the involvement of government ministries in guiding FDI, 
                                                            
58 See John P. Tuman and Craig F. Emmert.  “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct 
Investment in Latin America: A Reappraisal.”  Latin American Research Review, 39, 3 (2004): 9-28, Glen 
Biglaiser and Karl DeRouen.  “Economic Reforms and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin 
America.”  Latin American Research Review, 41, 1 (2006): 51-75, and John P. Tuman.  “The Political and 
Economic Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America.”  Latin American Research 
Review, 44, 1 (2009): 191-194.  
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and the preference for political stability, it is possible that state officials also guide 
Chinese firms to avoid political risk in external markets.  Thus, we might expect that 
countries that have revolutionary movements or widespread political unrest will not be 
attractive for FDI.   
Likewise, within developing areas, Chinese firms might prefer host countries that 
permit elections but restrict associational freedoms (i.e., labor rights and freedoms) to 
ensure stability in the investment environment.  Buckley et al. note that in some periods, 
Chinese FDI is associated with higher levels of political risk; however, they attribute this 
largely to differences in their sample between developed and developing countries (as 
opposed to differences amongst developing countries in their sample).59  Focusing 
exclusively on developing-country markets, Chinese firms generally have a preference 
for political risk avoidance – although tolerance for risk may be higher in host markets 
that are abundant in natural resources.  Finally, an important foreign policy goal might be 
to use FDI as leverage with states that continue to recognize Taiwan.  In particular, 
Chinese officials might pressure firms to avoid countries where the state has recognized 
Taiwan. 
Wang mentions some of the underlying political motivations behind external FDI 
and increased trade.  The common theme of acquiring a steady supply of natural 
resources to ensure economic growth, which appears in much of the literature in previous 
sections, is highlighted as a vital foreign policy directive.  The level of support for the 
One-China policy, backing of Beijing’s role in international organizations, and 
politicization of human rights can all impact the moves that large Chinese firms make in 
                                                            
59 Buckley et al., p. 510. 
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relation to outward FDI as well.60  Similarly, Wu and Chen also argue that China hopes to 
use outgoing FDI as a vehicle to develop further collaboration with other countries to 
assist Beijing in enhancing its economic and political status at the international level.61 
In terms of risk tolerance, the research findings of Buckley et al. found no 
evidence to support the notion that Chinese ODI is associated negatively with rising 
levels of host country political risk.  The article states that “…a 1% increase in the host 
country risk index (i.e., a decrease in risk) is associated with a decrease in Chinese ODI 
of 1.8%.”62  As mentioned earlier, it is inferred that the increasing relationship between 
host country political risk levels and Chinese ODI is a result of variance between rather 
than within developed and developing systems.  Nevertheless, the authors do propose a 
range of other reasons that may explain this phenomenon, including the possibilities that 
Chinese foreign investors may not perceive risk in the same way as firms from 
industrialized nations and that Chinese MNCs may also be prepared to invest in countries 
generally avoided by firms in industrialized nations for ethical reasons.  However, the 
assessment of what constitutes political risk in a host country might vary depending upon 
the national origin of the firm.63   
China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere: Implications for Latin America 
and the United States highlights geopolitical and geostrategic goals as the driving force 
behind Chinese foreign policy.  The two main objectives that constantly appear in 
Beijing’s foreign policy doctrine are energy security and the issue of Taiwan.  Moreover, 
                                                            
60 Wang, pp. 204-205.  
61 See Wu and Chen, 2001.   
62 Buckley et al., p. 510.  
63 Ping Deng suggests that the institutional environment in China might influence how Chinese 
firms view different risk factors in host countries.  See Ping Deng, 2009, pp. 76-77 and 79-81.  
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the Developing World is increasingly likely to be sensitive to China’s needs due to 
Beijing’s diplomatic offensive, which includes an aggressive combination of aid 
packages, infrastructure development projects, and increased trade, and further FDI.  
China’s non-interventionist approach to engaging developing countries with a foreign 
policy that avoids conditionalities also presents an attractive alternative to the policies of 
the West.64 
Part of Broadman’s research focuses on investment-trade linkages at the firm 
level by providing empirical evidence that is consistent with the information above on 
how Chinese businesses operate.  He explains that at the macro level success or failure in 
attracting FDI is based on a set of characteristics, many of which are either directly or 
indirectly related to political conditions in the host country.  Political stability, geography 
(proximity to markets), quality of infrastructure services, reform measures (official 
capital flows stimulate reform while private capital flows respond to reform), a sound and 
stable economic policy regime, and “behind-the-border” market-supporting institutions, 
especially those assuring a competitive business environment, legal protection and 
enforcement of property rights, sound governance, and market-reinforcing regulatory 
regimes governing the provision of basic infrastructure services are all identified as 
important political determinants affecting the external investment activities of Chinese 
enterprises.65  
                                                            
64 For a discussion on how China’s political and economic policies in Africa are seen as viable 
alternatives to programs and models from the West, such as the Washington Consensus, see Firoze Manji 
and Stephen Marks, Editors.  African Perspectives on China in Africa.  Cape Town, Nairobi, and Oxford: 
Pambazuka Press, 2007, pp. 42-44.   
65 See Broadman, p. 327 for a specific description of what the author considers a sound and stable 
economic policy regime.  
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China’s Economic Relationship with the Middle East and Africa: Implications for FDI 
and Trade  
This section is not meant to be a comprehensive survey or an exhaustive account 
of China’s relationship with the Middle East and Africa.  The purpose is to present an 
introduction to the reader that provides a backdrop for understanding contemporary 
relations as we move forward with a data-driven approach that seeks to quantitatively 
examine the FDI patterns of Chinese firms in these two parts of the Developing World.  
African Perspectives on China in Africa is an edited volume that attempts to 
present the African voice on the challenges and opportunities posed by China’s growing 
presence on the continent.66  Setting the stage for the rest of the text by examining 
China’s historical role in Africa, the authors contend that the driving force behind 
China’s increasing involvement in contemporary Africa is the need for raw materials to 
enable further economic expansion.  Thus, the Chinese government is encouraging its 
MNCs to invest in Africa and is helping to take on some of the risk by providing 
preferential loans and buyer credits.  In one way, Beijing’s expansion is framed as a 
positive development for the continent.  New opportunities for investment and the 
possibility of economic development without conditionalities are cited as benefits of this 
budding relationship.  Furthermore, the potential for “South-South” cooperation, 
particularly China providing Africa with better advice and sounder models on how to 
solve problems that are hindering the continent (e.g., lack of rural development, absence 
of national unity, and warlordism) due to Beijing’s similar historical experiences, is 
                                                            
66 See Manji and Marks, 2007. 
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mentioned.  Another point that is raised is the competition western corporations and 
governments now face, especially the alternative that Chinese aid now presents to 
international financial institutions in Africa.  On the other hand, the text argues that the 
Chinese model of development, which does not place much emphasis on democracy or 
human rights, may be attractive to more authoritarian African rulers, thereby diminishing 
human development in certain countries.  
The case studies that make up the bulk of the material in the book describe and 
analyze different issues related to Sino-African relations in specific contexts.  Beijing’s 
involvement and relations with Mozambique and Sudan are described as resembling 
traditional European colonialism and western neo-colonialism due to the exploitation of 
natural resources and the destructive impact of infrastructure developments on the 
environment.  Chinese practices in Africa, in general, are said to have deleterious 
environmental consequences on the continent, which, in some cases, resembles the 
practices of colonialists and neo-colonialists.   
The text subsequently contextualizes China’s relationship with Africa and 
analyzes the current status of relations with an eye toward the future.  Much of what we 
find in the previous literature is documented here, namely that China’s heavy interest and 
growing influence in Africa is a result of Beijing’s need for natural resources to help 
maintain economic growth.67  The authors also underscore the importance of bilateral 
relations in trade and investment between African countries and China, but reiterate that 
these relationships are mainly around the issue of natural resources.  Last, the notion is 
                                                            
67 The edited volume provides evidence, such as Africa being the source for 30% of China’s oil, to 
demonstrate growing Chinese dependence on Africa for natural resources.  See Ibid., p. 157.  This data was 
current as of the publication date of the text.   
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put forth that the idea of Chinese exceptionalism will fade as time goes by and African 
policymakers should pre-empt this by designing approaches more grounded in reality 
sooner rather than later. 
Broadman’s Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier 
argues that Chinese investors in Africa are influenced by a combination of economic 
factors.  Specifically, the need to secure natural resources, acquire strategic assets 
(technology, brands, and distribution channels), obtain market access, and the acquisition 
of platforms for exporting to Europe, the US, and other parts of the region.  Both Chinese 
FDI flows and stock to Africa are a small proportion of China’s overall FDI activities.  
Chinese FDI flows and stock to Latin America and Asia make up the majority of its 
foreign direct investment portfolio.68 
While historically China has been active in developing infrastructure in Africa, a 
large part of Chinese FDI has recently targeted oil-rich countries on the continent while 
its infrastructure development activities continue.  Broadman tells us that growing FDI 
from China to Africa is consistent with its trade patterns in the continent.  Thus, Chinese 
FDI is linked to Chinese trade with a focus on acquiring natural resources and the export 
of manufactured goods and products to Africa.  Additionally, “based on the gravity 
model incorporating the stock of inward FDI as one of its explanatory variables, FDI in 
African countries appears to be complementing rather than substituting for bilateral 
                                                            
68 Chinese FDI flows and stock data are from the time of the book’s publication.  Broadman also 
tell us that, as of 2007, most of the Chinese FDI in Africa had entered the continent in the form of 
Greenfield/De Novo investments (82% De Novo, 9% Joint Venture, and 9% Acquisition).  See Broadman, 
p. 291. 
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export flows.”69  Therefore, a positive correlation exists between increases in FDI and a 
rise in exports at the country level.   
China Considers the Middle East by Lillian Craig Harris documents the political 
and economic history of China’s growing involvement in the Middle East while 
analyzing Beijing’s policy approach to the region with an emphasis on the post-WWII 
era.70  The author identifies the PRC’s desire to maintain the Middle East as a buffer zone 
and security barrier against foreign encroachment from the West as one key goal that 
characterizes Chinese posture toward the region.71  Similar to some of above analysis on 
Sino-African relations, another guiding principle in formulating China’s Middle East 
policy has been the effort to portray Beijing as a model for Middle Eastern 
development.72  The text then breaks down China’s relationship with the Middle East into 
four chronological phases: anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist solidarity during the 
1950s, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, articulation of an 
alternative vision to Cold War politics that provided a “third way” forward in the 1970s, 
and the establishment of an independent foreign policy in the 1980s with achieving 
economic modernization and creating commercial ties as its primary pillars. 
During this evolutionary process of Sino-Middle Eastern relations, Beijing began 
by providing political support for the struggles against colonialism and imperialism 
taking place in the region as a reflection of the PRC’s attempt to prevent western 
domination of strategically significant areas around the world.  The next two steps were 
                                                            
69 Ibid., p. 102.  
70 See Lillian Craig Harris.  China Considers the Middle East.  London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 1993. 
71 Ibid., pp. xv, 246, and 277.  
72 Ibid., pp. 99-101.  
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marked by a Chinese break from the Soviet Union and support for various revolutionary 
causes in the Middle East in trying to accomplish the dual goals of undermining the two 
superpowers while at the same time offering a non-aligned path for states in the region.  
After being largely unsuccessful at realizing the aforementioned policy objectives, the 
final stage in the book highlights China’s autonomous foreign policy and its ambitions to 
advance its economic interests in the Middle East by focusing on increasing trade and 
vitalizing economic relations. 
The text concludes by examining the political implications of China’s future rise 
and the tensions it could create with the United States.  The end of the Cold War had, 
according to the author, simultaneously benefited and harmed China’s stature in the 
Middle East.  Harris argues that although communism had been discredited in the region 
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the people of the Middle East continued to view 
China as an emerging superpower.  The author, however, argues that Beijing’s primary 
motivations in the Middle East during the post-Cold War era are less political and more 
economic.  As the book strives to provide the proper historical perspective to understand 
modern Sino-Middle Eastern relations, the need to ensure the traditional regional role of 
acting as a security barrier and buffer zone for Beijing is a constant thread that appears 
throughout time in relation to China’s outlook on the Middle East. 
Geoffrey Kemp’s The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing 
Presence in the Middle East is a more recent account of the region’s economic and 
geopolitical relationships with its Asian neighbors.73  The main focus is on analyzing the 
                                                            
 73 See Geoffrey Kemp.  The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the 
Middle East.  Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 
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consequences of Chinese and Indian ambitions in the Middle East and the challenges they 
may pose for America’s hegemonic role in the region.  Kemp believes that China and 
India are currently content in allowing the US to continue carrying the burden of regional 
hegemony as long as the two are benefitting economically.  The text, nonetheless, argues 
that the growing economic interdependence between the Middle East and Asia’s rising 
powers will ultimately work to diminish the regional influence of the United States.   
As is the case in Africa, Beijing, we are told, is in a unique position to advance its 
interest in the Middle East.  China, not stigmatized by having the same legacies of 
colonialism and imperialism as the West, can cite a non-interventionist past as an impetus 
in expanding its business and commercial connections to the region.  The Chinese 
practice of avoiding interference in domestic politics and regional conflicts gives the PRC 
a further advantage in cultivating improved relations with states in the Middle East.  
Kemp also discusses how the growth of Asia’s emerging economies has led to the need to 
secure greater energy resources that are necessary both literally and figuratively in 
fueling sustained growth.      
Although increased investment activities and the search to secure access to 
abundant amounts of oil and natural gas has intensified dependence between Beijing and 
the Middle East, the book examines a historical dimension that connects these political 
actors as well.  The author cites the increased familiarity and enhanced opportunities that 
traditional ties and geographic proximity has given China over its competitors in their 
efforts to build better ties to the Middle East.  These dynamics, along with China not 
possessing the same historical baggage as the US and Europe in the region, have all 
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served as the basis for building more meaningful political links and establishing deeper 
economic ties. 
 While the text is heavily descriptive in providing a wealth of data and facts, it 
does discuss the uncertain impact that unresolved regional issues and conflicts can have 
on the Middle East’s burgeoning relationship with Beijing.   Kemp is skeptical about the 
possibilities of increased economic interdependence laying the foundation for political 
stability and wonders about the long-term viability of China’s reliance on soft power to 
advance its interests.  The author, when analyzing policy implications, raises the 
possibility of friction and potential confrontation between China on one hand and the 
United States on the other as these actors all pursue their own regional agendas.  We are 
left to ponder a future scenario where the US begins to abandon its hegemonic position in 
the region leaving a security void that will severely test China’s “hands off” approach.74 
Muhamad S. Olimat in China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab 
Spring provides a scholarly view of the growing Chinese presence in the Middle East 
from a regional perspective.75  The author begins by describing the longstanding 
historical, cultural, and commercial ties that initially developed over 2,000 years ago as a 
result of the main trade route from China to the Middle East known as the Silk Road.76  
He then identifies five areas that are at the core of contemporary Sino-Middle Eastern 
relations.  The text cites energy, trade, arms sales, cultural relations, and political 
cooperation as being the main catalysts behind China’s new strategic partnership with the 
                                                            
74 Ibid., p. 67.  
75 See Muhamad S. Olimat.  China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring.  London 
and New York: Routledge, 2013.  
76 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Middle East before analyzing triangular relationships between Beijing, regional players, 
and international actors.   
Olimat explains that, despite historical and cultural bonds that connect the two 
civilizations, China’s Middle East policy is guided by specific criteria meant to advance 
Beijing’s national interests.  The strategic nature of the relationship is determined on a 
case by case basis as the PRC interacts with regimes in the region.  On one side, Chinese 
engagement with Israel is focused on arms and technology while, on the other, China’s 
relationship with the United Arab Emirates centers on trade, investment, and commerce.  
It becomes clear, however, that the critical factor that unites China’s close relations with 
most states in the Middle East is natural resources.  Furthermore, Olimat argues that 
future trends and projections suggest that China will rely heavily on the Middle East for 
the majority of its oil in the near future as domestic demand increases and international 
competition for energy intensifies.77 
Additionally, shedding light on China’s response to the Arab Spring, the text 
argues that Beijing has taken a reactive approach by seeking to adapt to popular 
discontent in the Middle East in order to ensure that relations with key regional allies are 
not interrupted.  As China attempts to strike a delicate balance of maintaining the 
regional status quo while trying to avoid a backlash from the people of the Middle East, 
Olimat concludes that Chinese involvement in the region will increase in the near future 
as Beijing’s interests in the Middle East grow in importance. 
 
 
                                                            
77 Olimat expects China to rely on the Middle East for 75% of its oil in the next two decades.  See 
Ibid., p. 41.   
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Summary: Theoretical Expectations 
Based on the review of the secondary literature and the relevant theories on 
Chinese FDI, we can make certain preliminary expectations prior to analyzing the 
quantitative data on Chinese FDI in the Middle East and Africa.78  First, in terms of 
natural resources, an argument can be made for expecting a strong relationship between 
increasing levels of Chinese FDI and an abundance of fossil fuels and raw materials in 
the target country, in particular when it comes to securing access to oil, natural gas, and 
strategically important minerals.  Second, one may infer that firms from China have a 
tendency toward market orientation as well.  Thus, firms use trade as a method to deepen 
economic ties and lay the groundwork for future FDI.  Although the secondary literature 
is conflicted on this issue, there might also be an expectation that host economies with 
lower per capita income have greater potential for sales growth, particularly for Chinese 
firms that focus on lower value-added products.   
Shifting the focus to political influences, qualitative case studies suggest Chinese 
firms strive to avoid political risk in the Developing World.  Therefore, while not 
necessarily concerning themselves with internal politics and regime type, Chinese firms 
might place an emphasis on stability in the host country.  This may lead to greater FDI in 
developing states that demonstrate a stable business climate by curtailing civil liberties 
and associational life as well as having a track record of successfully honoring contracts.  
Also, in terms of foreign policy objectives, this study expects that states that offer 
diplomatic recognition to Taiwan will receive less, or no, Chinese FDI. 
                                                            
78 It is important to note that, when discussing firm behavior going forward, inferences are being 
made about individual level firm behavior from highly aggregated data that involves many firms, which is 
convention in similar types of aggregate studies.    
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All the sources under consideration in this survey have played a role in enhancing 
our understanding of a multitude of factors surrounding external Chinese FDI and 
China’s relationship with the Middle East and Africa.  As we can see, much of the 
literature on Chinese FDI focuses on actions and interactions with the Developed World.  
In addition, most of our sources examine the issue of outward Chinese investment from a 
qualitative perspective.  The analysis of China’s relationship with the Middle East and 
Africa leans heavily on the procurement of natural resources being the strategic rationale 
behind the PRC’s pivot toward the region and continent.  These observations 
notwithstanding, there is a dearth of quantitative evidence on the subject beyond basic 
facts and examples.  
Overall, the recent rise of Chinese FDI in the Developing World is a relatively 
insufficiently examined issue.  Scholars have concentrated much of their efforts on 
inflows of FDI to China or on creating an improved understanding of Chinese investment 
in advanced industrialized economies.  Previous academic scholarship on Chinese FDI in 
the Global South has given us valuable insight on the topic.  As is evident, however, past 
studies have disproportionately focused their attention on the economic underpinnings of 
policy formulation while comparatively neglecting to factor in the potential impact of 
political influences on the investment behavior of Chinese firms.  In order to address this 
scholarly lacuna, we will utilize a cross-sectional time-series incorporating both political 
and economic variables to more fully capture the determinants of Chinese FDI to the 
Middle East and Africa.  Before presenting the statistical results of the model, we turn 
our attention to a detailed discussion of the research design, data collection, and 
methodological aspects of the dissertation in the chapter to follow.   
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA COLLECTION, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND METHODOLOGY 
 The prior academic scholarship that investigates Chinese foreign direct 
investment to advanced industrialized states provides us with a valuable opportunity to 
examine this topic from a relatively understudied angle.  By building a statistical model 
that attempts to explain Chinese FDI patterns to the Middle East and Africa, I make use 
of a quantitative approach that allows one to study this process with an emphasis on two 
key areas within the Developing World.  In contrast to the literature that does exist on 
external Chinese FDI in the Global South, much of which utilizes a qualitative 
perspective via case studies, creating a data set and estimating a statistical model provides 
a multi-dimensional understanding of external flows of Chinese FDI to the region and 
continent.  Indeed, such an approach may yield more comprehensive results by 
accounting for a broader range of independent variables, such as political influences, that 
complement the dominance of economic concerns. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable that this dissertation employs is China’s annual real 
(inflation adjusted) net FDI outflows to the countries of the Middle East and Africa.  
During the time frame for the study (2003 through 2010), the amount of Chinese FDI (in 
total unadjusted millions of dollars) received by each country varied considerably.  Some 
countries, such as South Africa, received a net amount of over 4 billion dollars, while 
others had a net outflow of 63 million dollars (i.e., -63 million dollars).  Because of 
extreme differences in the amount of FDI received by countries in the data set, it is 
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advisable to normalize the data.  As Quan Li has suggested, using the natural log of 
Chinese FDI in each recipient country within the model is a useful way to address FDI 
data where there are outliers and extreme differences in the amount of FDI.1  Therefore, 
all of the FDI data are logged and in constant 2005 millions of US dollars, with an 
additive constant for observations that are zero or negative (for log transformation).  The 
data for Chinese FDI was collected from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the 
People’s Republic of China.2   
 It should be noted that prior to 2002, government statistics on external Chinese 
FDI were documented haphazardly with irregular reporting and underestimates of data.3  
However, in more recent years, the Chinese government began to compile and document 
FDI figures that are consistent with international standards established by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International 
Monetary Fund.4  As a result of the problems of comparability in FDI data before and 
after 2001, this dissertation limits analysis of Chinese FDI to the post-2002 time period.  
Although China was active in terms of external FDI prior to the 21st century, there was 
not a precipitous increase that was sustained over time until the early 2000s and beyond.  
Moreover, since the adoption of internationally accepted FDI compiling and recording 
                                                            
1 See Quan Li.  “Outlier, Measurement, and the Democracy-FDI Controversy.”  Quarterly Journal 
of Political Science, 4, 2 (2009): 167-181. 
2 The data on Chinese FDI was retrieved from the 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment, which is available at 
http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/accessory/201109/1316069658609.pdf. 
3 Leonard Cheng and Zihui Ma.  “China’s Outward FDI: Past and Future.”  Hong Kong University 
of Science and Technology, Working Paper No. 2007706001E, 2007, p. 3.  Also, see Tuman and Shirali, 
(forthcoming 2015). 
4 Cheng and Ma, p. 3.    
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methods, MOFCOM has only provided data from the year 2002 up until the end of the 
decade with the release of the 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign 
Direct Investment.5  Therefore, the time-frame I employ in seeking to understand 
variation on FDI emanating from China to the Middle East and Africa is from 2003 to 
2010.6  The data set itself is comprised of 57 countries located in the Middle East and 
Africa in which observations are part of a pooled time-series analysis covering an eight 
year period.7 
 
Independent Variables: Economic Influences 
To account for the salience of China’s strategic economic interests, I introduce a 
number of independent variables (the hypothesized direction for each independent 
variable is summarized below, in Table 1).  First, the model utilizes the natural log of real 
total bilateral trade (constant 2005 millions of US dollars) between China and the target 
nation.  The data are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity issues between FDI and 
                                                            
5 No specific reason has been given by the Ministry of Commerce as to why the cutoff date for the 
data on external Chinese FDI has, so far, been the year 2010.     
6 The period of 2003 through 2010 is used for the dependent variable.  Because of lagging of the 
independent variables, the first year of observations for the explanatory variables is 2002.  In order to 
address potential coverage issues, some data for 2002 (for the lagged dependent variable) were compared 
with figures in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) FDI database for 
specific recipient countries. 
7 The only countries within the region and continent that are absent from the model are Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Israel, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Somalia, South Sudan, and Swaziland.  These countries are not included as a result of missing 
data for some or all of the variables during the study period.  In particular, MOFCOM provides no data on 
outward FDI to all the aforementioned countries with the exception of Israel.  Moreover, Israel and South 
Sudan both fall outside the scope of the model for other reasons.  The former is considered a developed 
political system while the latter officially achieved independence in 2011.     
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trade.8  The statistics on Chinese trade and gross domestic product (GDP) as well as 
China’s consumer price index (base year 2005) were retrieved from the World Bank’s 
Development Indicators (various years) and the International Monetary Fund (various 
years).9  In order to measure the impact of natural resources in countries within the data 
set, statistics from the World Bank’s Development Indicators (various years) on ore and 
metals exports (as a percentage of a host country’s total manufactured exports, lagged by 
one year) are included in the analysis.   
Next, to examine the ramifications of China’s dependence on oil imports, I use a 
variable for net oil exporters (exports-imports) in the recipient with a one-year lag.  
Countries are coded according to the amount of net oil they export on a daily basis.  In 
the data set, the variable for net exports is coded in the following manner: “1” is 
indicative of 25,000 to 999,000 barrels per day; “2” denotes 1 to 1.99 million barrels per 
day; “3” signifies 2 to 2.99 million barrels per day; and “4” represents anything above 4 
million barrels per day.  Countries in the Middle East and Africa that have net oil exports 
that are less than 25,000 barrels per day, or who are net importers of the commodity, are 
coded as “0.”  The information on net petroleum was obtained from the US Energy 
Information Agency (various years).10  Finally, to properly account for the influence of 
recipient market size on inflows of Chinese FDI, a natural log of total real GDP per 
                                                            
8 Following Tuman and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015), my model uses combined trade data (that is, 
total imports plus exports) to avoid collinearity between measures of exports and imports.   
9 The data on Chinese trade, gross domestic product, and consumer price index were gathered 
from the World Bank’s Development Indicators, which may be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators and the International Monetary Fund’s statistical database at 
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm.   
10 The data on oil exports was collected from the international energy statistics provided by the US 
Energy Information Agency at http://www.eia.gov/countries/. 
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capita (constant 2005 thousands of US dollars), lagged by one year, is used as an 
independent variable.  The information on real GDP per capita comes from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators (various years).11 
 
Independent Variables: Political Influences 
In order to explain the possible effects that domestic political conditions may have 
on Chinese FDI flows, I employ the following variables in the model.  The first is a 
measure of human rights within a host economy.  The variable is derived from the mean 
of the civil liberties and political rights score for each host country.  The average scores 
are taken from a compilation of yearly surveys by Freedom House (2014).12  These 
annual reports that Freedom House produces assign each country a separate score for 
civil liberties and political rights using an ordinal seven-point scale, in which a higher 
score connotes fewer liberties and rights and vice versa (Freedom House 2014).13  
Although these rankings are made by Freedom House’s own staff, the organization brings 
in scholars who act as external auditors by using their expertise to ensure that scores are 
accurate (Freedom House 2014).14  Thus, the civil liberties and political rights scores put 
out by the organization are regularly used in the quantitative literature on FDI and are 
considered to be reliable. 
                                                            
11 Information on total real GDP per capita was also sourced from the World Bank’s Development 
Indicators at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
12 Freedom House scores were taken from annual Freedom in the World reports archived at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U8N91S-d7s0. 
13 See Ibid for a more detailed account of Freedom House’s methodology.    
14 Ibid.  
64 
 
An additional indicator of political conditions is revolution and civil conflict in 
the host country.  For this variable, I use data on the number of casualties from 
revolutions and civil wars in each recipient country, normalized to population (i.e., 
casualties per 100,000 members of the population) along with a one-year lag.  Using the 
raw data, I constructed an ordinal variable with several categories: “1” is for 10-100 
casualties per 100,000; “2” is for 101-1,000 casualties per 100,000; “3” is for 1,001-5000 
casualties per 100,000; “4” is for 5,001-15,000 casualties per 100,000; and “5” indicates 
casualties totaling more than 15,000 per 100,000.  The source of this information is the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (various years).15  One important note 
regarding the potential effects of mass political violence is that it will be considered in a 
separate trial.16 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Overall, the descriptive statistics for the variables in Table 2 below suggest the 
following patterns: The standard deviations for the recoded variables are clustered around 
the mean with the exception of ore and metals exports.  The variable on ore and metals 
exports has a significantly higher range (0 to 85.37) than any other statistic in the data set 
with some countries relying heavily on the export of these types of natural resources 
                                                            
15 The data on armed conflicts was retrieved from Appendix 2A of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute’s 2011Yearbook, which is available at 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/02/02A. 
16 As a result of the emphasis within the literature on China not concerning itself with internal 
politics when investing, the first model will include all economic indicators plus the Freedom House 
averages in order to determine the level of variation on Chinese FDI that human rights abuse can explain.  
Subsequently, civil conflict will be added in a separate model to understand the impact of instability on 
Chinese FDI. 
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while others, devoid of an abundant endowment of minerals, are not involved in the 
activity at all.  However, the range and standard deviation for ore and metals are 
reasonable, and the data do not suggest the need for additional transformations.17  
Another important observation is that the means for the dependent variable and its lagged 
counterpart both come close to being in the middle of the range, which demonstrates that 
there are no major issues for or against Chinese FDI in the sample data.  Thus, the 
descriptive statistics provide an overview that allows for better insight of what to look for 
when making inferences by analyzing the data further.     
 
Estimation Methods 
The data set employed in this study pools observations of FDI in each country 
across an eight-year period.  Therefore, the data set may be described as a pooled cross-
sectional time-series (PCSTS).  During the past two decades, the use of PCSTS data has 
increased drastically in quantitative political analysis and is now considered the standard 
in the subfields of international relations, comparative politics, and comparative political 
economy.18  Since my time-series only covers a span of eight years, the data set may be 
described as cross-sectionally dominant.   
As documented in the literature, pooling data for the purposes of estimation may 
result in several violations of the classical linear regression method.19  Panel 
                                                            
17 Additional trials with the log transformation of ore and metals produced results that are 
consistent with the models reported below. 
18 See Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo Molino, Editors.  International 
Encyclopedia of Political Science (Volume 1). Washington D.C.: SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 2615.  
19 See Nathanial Beck and Jonathan N. Katz.  “What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series 
Cross-Section Data.”  American Political Science Review, 89, 3 (September 1995): 634-647. 
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heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are common problems in PCSTS data sets.  After 
performing diagnostics, I found that tests indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the data.20  To correct for statistical bias introduced by 
heteroscedasticity, I followed standard econometric methods by using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and panel-corrected standard errors.21  To adjust for potential 
autocorrelation issues, I estimate the model with a lagged dependent variable, Chinese 
real FDI (t-1), as an independent variable in the model.22  Finally, the results of the model 
may be distorted by outliers and highly influential countries (i.e., unit effects).  After 
examining the data, only two units were identified.23  In the next chapter, I present the 
statistical results of my model and analyze the data. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
20 Beck and Katz have shown that panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) perform better than the 
generalized least squares (GLS) method.  See Beck and Katz, 1995, p. 639, Table 2 and Nathanial Beck and 
Jonathan N. Katz.  Time-Series–Cross-Section Issues: Dynamics, 2004.  Paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology, Stanford, CA, July 2004, p. 4, footnote 6.  
21  See Beck and Katz, 1995 and Beck and Katz, 2004, p. 4.  For diagnostic analysis of 
multicollinearity, see Appendix A. 
22 See Ibid.  
23 I estimated the model and then examined the summed residuals for each country for potentially 
influential units.  The analysis yielded only two potential unit effects for Seychelles and South Africa.  
They are modeled in each equation, but the results are not included in Tables 3 and 4.  For a discussion, see 
James A Stimson.  “Regression in Time and Space: A Statistical Essay.”  American Journal of Political 
Science, 29, 4 (November 1985): 920.  Also, see Beck and Katz, 2004, pp. 6 and 14-15, and Nathanial Beck 
and Jonathan N. Katz.  “Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series Cross-Section Data: Monte Carlo 
Experiments.”  Political Analysis, 15, 2 (2007): 182-195.   
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Table 1: Determinants of Chinese FDI in the Middle East and Africa, 2003-2010 
 
Variable     Expected Direction 
       
Real Chinese Trade with Recipient, 
log (t-1) 
+ 
Chinese FDI, log (t-1) + 
Chinese FDI (Lagged), log (t-1) + 
Inflation, log (t-1) - 
Net Oil Exports from Recipient (t-1)  + 
Ore and Metals Exports (% of Total 
Manufacturing Exports) (t-1) 
+ 
Human Rights Abuse in Recipient (t-1) + 
Revolutionary Conflict and Civil War 
(Deaths Per 100,000 in Recipient) (t-1) 
- 
Real GDP Per Capita (Lagged), log (t-
1)                                   
+/- 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
           Variable                  Mean        Standard Deviation 
 
Real Chinese Trade with 
Recipient, log (t-1) 
5.991635 1.93932 
Chinese FDI, log (t-1) 4.316666 .4054868 
Chinese FDI (Lagged), log (t-1) 4.270246 .3642838 
Inflation, log (t-1) .0494334 .5407755 
Net Oil Exports from the 
Recipient(t-1) 
.4686717 .9685486 
Ore and Metals Exports (% of 
Total Manufacturing Exports) (t-1) 
7.972851 16.40259 
Human Rights Abuse in Recipient 
(t-1) 
4.502506 1.582328 
Revolutionary Conflict and Civil 
War (Deaths Per 100,000 in 
Recipient) (t-1) 
.1025 .4152407 
Real GDP Per Capita (Lagged), 
log (t-1)   
7.177947 1.547789 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS OF CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA  
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide the statistical findings of this study 
through an examination of two models that focus on economic and political determinants 
of Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa.  Initially, there will be a presentation of 
the results of the statistical models along with accompanying commentary analyzing the 
explanatory power of the data.  Subsequently, a discussion of case studies assesses how 
well the qualitative literature reinforces the quantitative approach that this study is based 
on.  Last, a brief final section concisely summarizes the main findings of the data analysis 
before moving on to the concluding chapter.   
 
Statistical Findings 
The analysis begins with the basic model of Chinese FDI, which is presented in 
Table 3.  The statistical results of the model lend support to some of the major hypotheses 
and theories on Chinese foreign direct investment that were described earlier in the 
dissertation.  First, the coefficient for net oil exports is positive and statistically 
significant.  This suggests that after adjusting for other influences in the model, Chinese 
FDI, on average, was attracted to net oil exporters.  This finding is also consistent with 
the hypothesis on state-guidance to secure oil.  As highlighted in the literature review, 
Beijing has encouraged firms from the Mainland to go abroad in order to obtain access to 
fossil fuels.  China’s dependency on natural resources is a byproduct of its desire to 
maintain a relatively high level of economic growth.  Oil imports from the Middle East 
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and Africa, where an absolute majority of the world’s proven oil reserves are located, 
have played a particularly visible role in this process as much international attention has 
been directed toward FDI activities by Chinese multi-nationals operating in this sector in 
both the region and continent.1    
 The coefficient for ores and metals exports in the recipient is positive and 
statistically significant as well.  This result indicates that Chinese FDI activities in the 
Middle East and Africa have a tendency to gravitate toward countries that have 
significant ores and metals exports.2  As with the procurement of oil, the continuation of 
economic development in China has also made the country dependent on other types of 
raw materials.  The imperative to secure access to mineral wealth has been a key source 
of commercial activity emanating from China in the Developing World.  While policy 
makers are cognizant of the potential for tensions to arise as a result of competition with 
the US, Japan, or European powers for energy and resource extraction, the drive to ensure 
a steady supply of ores and metals, an abundance of which is deposited in the Middle 
East and Africa, further supports the claim that Chinese government officials attempt to 
use FDI as a vehicle to acquire strategically important natural resources.3 
                                                            
1 The second part of this chapter will consist of a discussion section that builds upon the statistical 
results and provides further analysis along with contemporary cases that demonstrate and reinforce some of 
the findings.  
2 Although the African states in the sample account for most of the ores and metals exports, 
several Middle Eastern states also had small to modest levels of ores and metals exports too (e.g., Syria, 
Oman, Iran, and Jordan).  
3 Africa alone contains one-third of all mineral reserves in the world.  See Anonymous.  “African 
Economic Growth: The Twilight of the Resource Curse?”  The Economist, 414, 8920 (January 10th-16th, 
2015): 41.     
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The coefficient for the natural log of real GDP per capita is negative and 
significant.  Despite the propensity to focus on market size when investing in mature 
economies, the results here demonstrate that, in the Middle East and Africa, Chinese 
firms are not necessarily market oriented for the time period under investigation.  After 
adjusting for the effects of oil and ores/metals exports, the model indicates that Chinese 
FDI was heavily concentrated in economies with lower per capita income.  This may be 
the consequence of Chinese multi-national corporations consciously deciding to target 
countries with lower per capita income due to fewer entry barriers, less competition, 
reduced labor costs, and possible sales growth opportunities.4  Along the same lines, the 
coefficient for inflation is not statistically significant, and therefore does not explain 
variation on the dependent variable during the period in question. 
The coefficient for the natural log of Chinese trade with the recipient is positive 
and highly significant.  This clearly suggests that prior levels of trade have a strong effect 
on Chinese FDI.5  This finding is consistent with earlier expectations on the importance 
of trade vis-à-vis FDI and the theory of state-guidance.  The state-centered approach 
explains that trade can serve as an antecedent to FDI.  Similarly, the Chinese government 
also directs firms to utilize trade and commerce as a path to market entry in the Middle 
East and Africa.  Beyond permitting firms to gain a foothold in a host country’s market, 
trade gives firms an opportunity to assess the feasibility of expanding market share.  
Subsequently, if trade yields positive sales results, firms may elect to further consolidate 
their market presence in the host through FDI.  The linkage between these two activities 
                                                            
4 Broadman, pp. 181-183.  Also, see Tuman and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015) for a similar finding.   
5 Broadman, 2007 and Chen and Lin, 2008 both found a positive connection between trade and 
Chinese FDI. 
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can serve other mutually advantageous purposes as well.  As part of a larger strategy, 
Chinese firms may also use FDI as a catalyst to increase bilateral trade.   
 
Table 3: Determinants of Chinese FDI in the Middle East and Africa, 2003-2010 (Model 
1) 
 
              Coefficient            Panel-Corrected 
                  Standard Error  
      
Real Chinese Trade with 
Recipient, log (t-1) 
0.0512547***    0.0198177 
Chinese FDI (Lagged Dependent 
Variable), log (t-1) 
0.3175535    0.2421584 
Inflation, log (t-1) -0.0180585    0.0275093 
Net Oil Exports from the 
Recipient(t-1) 
0.062249*    0.0324223 
Ore and Metals Exports (% of 
Total Manufacturing Exports) (t-1) 
0.002865***     0.001039 
Human Rights Abuse in Recipient 
(t-1) 
-0.0226325*   0.0131072 
Real GDP Per Capita (Lagged), 
log (t-1) 
-0.0358643**    0.0159664 
Intercept 2.930908*** 1.018616 
R2 0.3083   
Wald Chi-square 95.49   
N 371  
 
Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors 
are reported in the right-hand column.  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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In addition to economic determinants, the model factors in political influences to 
examine whether domestic political conditions in the host affect Chinese FDI patterns.  In 
the model presented in Table 3, this is done by analyzing the impact of human rights 
abuse on FDI flows in host countries.  The results in Table 3 show that the coefficient for 
human rights abuse is negative and statistically significant.  In fully interpreting this data, 
it is useful to examine the average for human rights abuse within the model.  For the 
countries from the Middle East and Africa under consideration in the data set, the average 
score for human rights abuse is 4.5, which means most states in the model do not exhibit 
a high degree of democratization.  While the coefficient suggests that for every increase 
of one point or more in abuse is associated with a reduction in FDI, the result here is 
indicative of Chinese FDI trending toward Middle Eastern and African regimes that are 
mildly authoritarian.  Indeed, analysis of the data suggests that approximately 42% of the 
Chinese FDI (log) during this period was concentrated in states that had a mean rights 
and liberties abuse score ranging from 4 to 5.5, indicating regimes with moderate 
restrictions on rights and liberties.  By contrast, only 17% of Chinese FDI (log) was 
directed to states with a mean score of 1 to 2.5. 
The results in the model also indicate that, other than ensuring governments 
enforce property rights and honor contractual obligations, China, generally speaking, 
does not focus on internal politics in its economic relationship with the Middle East and 
Africa.  The data further suggests that China, while tolerating electoral competition, may 
invest in regimes that impose moderate restrictions on political rights, associational 
freedoms, and civil liberties.  What might account for this pattern?  Firms are sensitive to 
the perception that China’s growing presence in the region and continent may be viewed 
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as eastern neo-imperialism and/or corporate recolonization.6  Therefore, host 
governments that limit press freedoms, assembly rights, and other aspects of civil society 
are possibly seen as more attractive targets for FDI since public criticism of Chinese 
economic activities can be suppressed, political arrangements are viewed as being stable, 
and investments are considered secure.  This phenomenon is also similar to the 
institutional environment in China, where the regime restricts political rights while 
permitting increasing economic freedoms.  The resemblance may play a role in 
precipitating FDI to parts of the Middle East and Africa that display these characteristics 
due to increased Chinese comfort as a result of familiarity. 
Also, the variable for Taiwan did not yield enough observations for analysis.7  
Last, the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable, Chinese FDI logged (t-1), is 
positive, but fails to achieve statistical significance.  The reason may be that Chinese FDI 
to the Middle East and Africa is a relatively new phenomenon.  Consequently, this 
variable within the model fails to completely capture the consistency of FDI flows across 
countries in both the region and continent.  
Table 4 includes all the same covariates as the previous model, but adds another 
political indicator in civil conflict as an independent variable to measure the impact of 
civil war casualties.  The addition of deaths (per 100,000 in the recipient) from civil 
conflict in the Middle East and Africa did not achieve statistical significance.  Moreover, 
the inclusion of this coefficient had a negligible effect on the overall model as all other 
                                                            
6 See Manji and Marks, pp. 51-52 and 161.  
7 Previous research has shown that states that no longer recognize Taiwan and adopt the One-
China policy begin to receive more Chinese FDI.  See Tuman and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015) for an 
example.  However, there was insufficient variation as a result of not enough countries within the data set 
recognizing Taiwan to include it as a variable in the models. 
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variables remained consistent with the model in Table 3.  This suggests that political 
instability associated with civil conflict in these two parts of the Developing World does 
not have any effect on Chinese FDI. 
This result from the analysis reinforces the notion that internal political conditions 
in countries do no impact recipient FDI from China.  This subsequently lends explanatory 
power to the notion that Chinese firms, unlike their counterparts in advanced 
industrialized states, have a higher tolerance for political risk in a host economy.  While 
firms from the West have an arguably greater chance at becoming the targets of popular 
discontent, due to imperial footprints and colonial legacy, if or when political unrest 
emerges, China’s historical lack of interventionist politics in the region and continent 
bolsters Beijing’s willingness to accept certain levels of political risk.8   
Although regime type and stability are important to China insofar as contracts are 
honored and property rights are respected, firms from the Mainland have been 
concentrating their investment activities in states that can be characterized as 
authoritarian.   Chinese firms, again, may view authoritarianism as a positive 
development due to institutional familiarity and the belief that restrictive regimes may be 
safer destinations for FDI due to the political stability they can provide.  While this 
outlook may ultimately carry more inherent political risk than investments in democratic 
countries, China seems willing to accept the potential long-term consequences of this 
approach in order to take advantage of its immediate benefits.  Thus, in principle, the 
                                                            
8 Firms from the US and Europe may also have to deal with the fallout from perceived or actual 
support provided by their governments for unpopular regimes in the Middle East and Africa.  Whereas 
China, on the other hand, attempts to practice a “hands-off” approach in dealing with domestic politics in 
other countries.   See Kemp, 2010.   
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finding on deaths resulting from civil conflict might be viewed as consistent with the 
results yielded from the variable on human rights abuse.      
 
Table 4: Determinants of Chinese FDI in the Middle East and Africa, 2003-2010 (Model 
2) 
 
 
               Coefficient            Panel-Corrected 
                  Standard Error  
      
Real Chinese Trade with 
Recipient, log (t-1) 
0.0500061***    .0183979 
Chinese FDI (Lagged Dependent 
Variable), log (t-1) 
0.3171181    0.2421503 
Inflation, log (t-1) -0.0163808   0.0253494 
Net Oil Exports from the 
Recipient(t-1) 
0.0642499*    0.0330051 
Ore and Metals Exports (% of 
Total Manufacturing Exports) (t-1) 
0.0029301***     0.0009854 
Human Rights Abuse in Recipient 
(t-1) 
-0.0228868*   0.0127354 
Revolutionary Conflict and Civil 
War (Deaths Per 100,000 in 
Recipient) (t-1) 
0.0307934 0.0713482 
Real GDP Per Capita (Lagged), 
log (t-1) 
-0.0354828**    0.0153547 
Intercept 2.933708*** 1.018528 
R2 0.3093  
Wald Chi-square 100.08  
N 371  
 
Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors 
are reported in the right-hand column.  *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Discussion 
 The qualitative evidence on outward Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa 
helps support the statistical analysis in this chapter.  This is particularly evident in 
relation to commodities.  As mentioned above, the coefficients for oil and ores/metals 
exports are positive and statistically significant.  This supports the idea that Beijing 
guides firms to invest in countries that possess natural resources that are strategically 
important for emerging sectors in China.  It is important to reiterate that China’s rapid 
economic expansion has made the country dependent on these raw materials in order to 
sustain future growth. 
We can see the relationship between state guidance and Chinese FDI in natural 
resources through an examination of recent investment projects in Africa.  In this context, 
the multi-billion dollar Sino-Congolese Cooperation Agreement signed in 2007 is a fairly 
representative example of the use of FDI by China to acquire access to valuable mineral 
resources.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo, even by African standards, possesses 
a diverse array and vast amount of natural resources.  Diamonds, gold, copper, zinc, 
uranium, cobalt, coltan, tantalum, and other ores and metals can be found in tremendous 
abundance in different parts of the country.  Beijing directed state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to form a joint venture with the Congo where China would receive $9 billion 
worth of resources to be exchanged for the same amount in infrastructure.9  The 
agreement allowed two Chinese SOEs, Sinohydro and the China Railway Construction 
Corporation, to retain two-thirds majority ownership with the remaining portion of the 
                                                            
9 For a detailed analysis of the Agreement, see Stefaan Marysse and Sara Geenen.  “Win-win or 
unequal exchange: The case of the Sino-Congolese cooperation agreements.”  The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 47, 3 (September 2009): 371-396.      
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joint venture belonging to the Congo.  Consequently, there was a sharp spike and 
continued increase in Chinese FDI after this agreement was finalized.  The joint venture 
was ultimately given exclusive rights to develop multi-billion dollar mines consisting 
primarily of copper, cobalt, and gold while the Congo received the largest infrastructure 
investment in the country’s entire history.                      
Similar patterns of the strategic use of Chinese FDI to gain control over supplies 
of energy and ores/metals resources can be found in others parts of Africa as well as the 
Middle East.  The GDPs of Botswana and Zambia heavily rely on ores/metals exports 
and mining activities.10  As part of a larger package giving China a stake in the mineral 
wealth of these two economies, Botswana and Zambia, as was the case in the Congo, 
agreed to allow Chinese SOEs to build modern infrastructure in both places.    
Oil and petroleum related products account for the absolutely majority of exports 
from Nigeria, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo for the years that fall within the 
scope of this study.11  Sinopec and the China National Offshore Oil Company, two of the 
largest Chinese SOEs in the field of energy, in 2005, 2007, and the first half of 2010 
gained multiple oil concessions, a stake in Nigerian oil production, and a large share of 
the country’s reserves.12   
                                                            
10 In 2006, the mining and extraction of diamonds, gold, and copper made up approximately half 
of Botswana’s GDP while Zambia’s GDP was almost entirely copper-dependent.  See Anonymous.  
“African Economic Growth: The Twilight of the Resource Curse?”  The Economist, p. 42.     
11 The Republic of the Congo should not be confused with its neighbor, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo.  Oil accounts for 95% of exports in Nigeria, slightly less in Angola, and 80% in the Republic 
of the Congo.  See Anonymous.  “African Economic Growth: The Twilight of the Resource Curse?”  The 
Economist, p. 42.    
12 These deals are particularly significant due to the fact that Nigeria contains the second largest 
amount of proven oil reserves in all of Africa.   
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Angola, Africa’s second largest producer of oil, signed multiple agreements with 
Sinopec and established a joint venture with the company for oil exploration, production, 
and refinement from 2004-2009.13  Angola agreed to accept three major multi-billion 
dollar infrastructure improvement projects in return.  Likewise, as of 2007, China 
received half of the Republic of the Congo’s annual oil production in exchange for an 
equivalent amount of infrastructure development. 
One of the key economic dimensions of Sino-Iranian relations revolves around 
Chinese efforts to procure natural resources from the Islamic Republic.  To this end, 
Sinopec and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, beginning in the early 2000s, 
signed numerous billion dollar contracts with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
that range from join ventures in developing oil fields to exclusive drilling rights to 
modernizing upstream and downstream capabilities to multi-year agreements on 
importing Iranian fossil fuels.14  Around the same time, the imposition of punitive United 
Nations Security Council resolutions aimed at sanctioning Iran for its controversial 
nuclear program did little to prevent economic cooperation between Iran and China as 
FDI levels increased significantly in the late 2000s.15  
                                                            
13 The joint venture, along with previous agreements, was between Sinopec and Sonangol, 
Angola’s national oil company. 
14 One unique aspect of Iranian joint ventures with foreign firms in the energy sector is that these 
are usually equal partnerships where ownership is split evenly.  These agreements can also feature a “buy-
back” clause that allows Iran to purchase the remaining share from the firm at a profit in order to retain full 
ownership.  
15 It is important to mention that navigating through the myriad of international and unilateral 
sanctions that have been imposed on Iran by different actors within the international community is no easy 
task.  However, Iran has become adept at doing so as a consequence of its lengthy experience in dealing 
with various forms of sanctions since the inception of the Islamic Republic.  Although Iran usually prefers 
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Even with Chinese firms moving in the direction of trying to reach consumer 
markets via FDI, the coefficient for the natural log of real GDP per capita, highlighted 
above, was negative and statistically significant.  Therefore, the direction of FDI flows in 
the Middle East and Africa typically targeted hosts with low levels of per capita income 
as opposed to being market oriented.  This could represent the desire of Chinese firms to 
gear FDI to relatively poorer countries in the region and continent due to the potential for 
sales growth in newer markets.  In this area, China has a distinct advantage over domestic 
producers and international competitors in that firms from the Mainland are able to 
produce goods and provide services that are of comparable quality at lower costs.16 
China’s economic relationship with Ethiopia provides an example that helps 
illustrate the above-mentioned statistical finding.  In many instances in the Developing 
World, China has leveraged its excess industrial and manufacturing capacity through 
non-resource related FDI by utilizing cheap labor, favorable entry conditions, and weak 
competition to reach untapped markets.  As noted in The Economist: 
A Chinese government survey of 1,600 companies shows the growing use of 
Africa as an industrial base.  Manufacturing’s share of total Chinese investment 
(22%) is catching up fast with mining (29%).17  
 
Thus, market-seeking FDI in Ethiopia, a low-income economy, has led to two out of 
three Chinese firms being manufacturers.18  Although not much overlap exists between 
local markets and manufacturing investments made by Chinese firms in the Middle East 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
to receive hard currency for its oil and natural gas exports, China has increasingly used infrastructure 
development projects as substitutes when processing payments has become extremely challenging.        
16 Kemp, p. 12.  
17 Anonymous.  “Trying to pull together: Africans are asking whether China is making their lunch 
or eating it.”  The Economist, 399, 8730 (April 23rd-29th, 2011): 10.     
18  Ibid. 
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and Africa, occasionally there is an adverse impact that comes with China’s competitive 
advantage in this area.  Textiles and labor-intensive consumer goods are usually the 
hardest hit.  Chinese competitors in Ethiopia, due to better overall design, price, and 
quality, were able to take full command of the footwear industry by either supplanting 
most local producers or forcing them to downsize considerably.19         
Jordan and Yemen serve as two more cases that demonstrate the negative effect of 
market wealth on Chinese FDI in the region and continent.  The non-resource 
investments made by firms from China in both countries are mainly in the form of 
manufacturing facilities and providing services.  Huawei Technologies, the largest 
telecommunications equipment maker in the world, made its first ever foreign sale in 
Yemen, which, along with subsequent investments by the firm, provided the necessary 
groundwork for the establishment of the first 3G mobile telecommunications network in 
the entire country.20  Chinese companies have agreed to build power plants, upgrade 
airports, develop container ports, and modernize factories that produce basic materials.21  
This flurry of economic activity has allowed China to become Yemen’s top import 
partner.    
 Chinese investment habits in Jordan have taken on much of the same non-
resource characteristics as FDI in Yemen.  Firms from mainland China have signed 
                                                            
19 See Tegegne Gebre-Egziabher.  “Impacts of Chinese imports and coping strategies of local 
producers: the case of small-scale footwear enterprises in Ethiopia.”  The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 45, 4 (November 2007): 647-679. 
20 Winter Nie, William Dowell, and Abraham Lu.  In the Shadow of the Dragon: The Global 
Expansion of Chinese Companies–And How It Will Change Business Forever.  New York: AMACOM, 
2012, p. 71.      
21 See Chris Zambelis.  “Burgeoning China-Yemen Ties Showcase Beijing’s Middle East 
Strategy.”  The Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 6, 11 (May 2006).     
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agreements to provide the Hashemite Kingdom with broad improvements in 
infrastructure designed to achieve sustainable socio-economic development.  This 
includes a series of memorandums on constructing hospitals, creating low-income 
housing, upgrading water supply facilities, and building oil shale, wind energy, and solar 
power plants.22  These deals opened a gateway for Chinese companies to successfully 
penetrate the Jordanian textile market and take advantage of the country’s unique position 
in the industry as a leading supplier of garments and apparel to the United States.23  As of 
2008, wholly or partially owned firms from China already accounted for over 30% of the 
textile presence in Jordan.24  Overall, China’s economic involvement in Jordan has 
resulted in trade flourishing between the two with the former now occupying a leading 
role in exporting goods, especially textile fabrics, electronics, and machinery, to the 
Hashemite Kingdom. 
The coefficient for the natural log of Chinese trade with the recipient was 
identified above as being positive and statistically significant.  This confirms the 
hypothesis in the literature that China may use FDI to establish commercial operations in 
recipient countries that promote Chinese imports.  Beijing has also encouraged firms to 
use trade patterns as a precursor to market entry through FDI.  Likewise, FDI may be 
used to help create subsidiaries in recipients that can function to increase trade and/or 
focus on exporting strategically important resources back to China.   
                                                            
22 Specific information on these projects may be retrieved from official press releases located on 
the Jordanian government’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation’s website at 
http://www.mop.gov.jo/. 
23 This is the result of a 2001 free trade agreement with the United States.  
24 Shamel Azmeh and Khalid Nadvi.  “‘Greater Chinese’ Global Production Networks in the 
Middle East: The Rise of the Jordanian Garment Industry.”  Development and Change, 44, 6 (November 
2013): 1326.   
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China’s pre-existing trade relations with South Africa, particularly in the textile 
industry, laid the foundation for Chinese FDI.25  From 2005-2010, there was a dramatic 
increase in bilateral trade accompanied by an exponential growth in Chinese FDI.26  
South Africa, one of the continent’s largest economies, had now become China’s leading 
trade partner in Africa.  South Africa turned into a top target for Chinese textiles and 
manufactured goods while firms from the Mainland invested in infrastructure and 
agricultural projects and successfully sought the extraction of platinum, gold, diamonds, 
titanium, chromium, niobium, tantalum and other ores/metals. 
China’s trade relations with Saudi Arabia cover a multitude of areas, including 
petrochemicals, construction, and consumer commodities.27  Bilateral trade between the 
two sides grew at a minimum annual rate of at least 30% from 2002-2009.28  The rapid 
growth of commercial ties between China and Saudi Arabia, which have their origins in 
the late 1970s, led to the Kingdom becoming the Mainland’s leading trade partner in the 
Arab world and paved the way for an influx of Chinese FDI.  Outward FDI from China 
either increased or remained constant from 2003-2010 as Chinese firms, such as Sinopec, 
partnered with Saudi Aramco in oil exploration, field development, and building and 
increasing refining capacity.  Over this same time period, the Kingdom became the 
leading provider of crude oil to China as well. 
                                                            
25 See Tuman and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015).    
26 See Sven Grimm, Yejoo Kim, Ross Anthony, Robert Atwell, and Xin Xiao.  “South African 
relations with China and Taiwan: Economic realism and the ‘One-China’ doctrine.”  Centre for Chinese 
Studies, (February 2014): 18.  
27 Olimat, p. 143.  
28 From 2002-2007, trade increased anywhere from 30%-50% on a yearly basis while a 64.7% 
jump occurred in 2008.  See Ibid., pp. 143-144.  
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The core component of Chinese economic cooperation with the United Arab 
Emirates centers on trade.  China’s commercial relationship with the United Arab 
Emirates traces its roots back to the mid-1980s and has become fairly comprehensive in 
nature as it encompasses a wide-range of sectors.  As Olimat explains: 
China exports textiles, electronics, motor parts, chemicals, foodstuffs, high-tech 
equipment, machinery, solar energy…In return, the UAE exports oil, natural gas, 
merchandise, and services.29  
 
The value of bilateral trade between China and the UAE appreciated almost every year 
from 2001 to 2011.30  The steady increase in Sino-Emirati trade activity during the first 
decade of the 21st century was a harbinger that set the stage for a similar pattern of 
outward Chinese FDI to the UAE.31  Currently, there are approximately 3,900 Chinese 
companies that operate in the United Arab Emirates with these firms occupying leading 
positions in providing engineering, construction, and other related services to the 
sheikhdoms that comprise the country.32 
As noted previously, the coefficient for human rights abuse, as measured by the 
Freedom House average, was negative and significant while the independent variable for 
civil conflict, in terms of deaths per 100,000 in the recipient, did not cross the threshold 
of statistical significance in the model.  This data points to Chinese firms seeking out 
developing countries that, similar to China itself, restrict rights and liberties in the interest 
of maintaining political stability to the extent it takes to achieve a favorable investment 
climate.  Thus, firms from China may be prone to avoiding political risk if they believe 
                                                            
29 Ibid., p. 165. 
30 See Table 8.1 in Ibid.  
31 External FDI from China to the UAE progressively increased for the majority of the years in the 
data set (2003-2010). 
32 See Olimat, pp. 164-166.  
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that property rights, contractual obligations, and other investment related activities may 
be jeopardized. 
 The cases of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo capture the 
complex nature of China’s political risk analysis when it comes to FDI and trade.  As the 
Second Sudanese Civil War between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army was winding down in 2005, the conflict in Darfur was 
beginning to heat up.33  During the first decade of the 21st century, China had cultivated a 
strong economic relationship with Sudan as firms from the Mainland provided 
development finance and assistance while Khartoum agreed to export petroleum to the 
People’s Republic.  Sudan also gave the China National Petroleum Company the largest 
stake in the country’s biggest oil firm, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company.34   
 As conflict continued to persist, Omar al-Bashir’s regime was accused of 
systematic human rights violations by members of the international community as the 
death toll from violence continued to increase in Darfur.  In addition to instability in the 
western part of the country, questions still remained on how Khartoum would react to the 
southern region of Sudan voting for independence.35  The Sudanese government was put 
under the spotlight as a humanitarian crisis emerged in the Darfur region that was 
                                                            
33 The Second Sudanese Civil War ended when the belligerents on both sides agreed to a peace 
deal that would allow the people living in the southern portion of Sudan to hold a referendum six years later 
on whether the region should become independent or remain part of Sudan.  An overwhelming majority 
voted yes for independence and the new nation-state of South Sudan was created in 2011.  The conflict in 
Darfur began in 2003. 
34 The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company is a joint venture that was established in 1997 
and the China National Petroleum Company was given a 40% stake.  
35 The southern third of the country is where much of Sudan’s oil is located.  
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accompanied by harsh rebukes, condemnations, accusations of genocide, and various 
unilateral and multi-lateral sanctions. 
China did not escape criticism either for being one of Sudan’s largest economic 
partners.36  Despite instability in Darfur, increased pressure on Khartoum, and uncertainty 
in the southern part of Sudan, from 2003-2010, Chinese FDI, on average, remained 
constant and overall trade with Sudan increased as conflict escalated.  China’s reaction 
highlights some of the conclusions that were made when interpreting the data on human 
rights abuse and civil conflict.  It demonstrates Beijing’s strict adherence to a policy of 
non-interference in the internal politics of recipient states.  It underscores the relatively 
high levels of tolerance that Chinese firms can have for political risk in environments that 
are unstable as long as investments seem protected.  By extension, it also shows that, 
while host regime type is not of paramount importance, firms from China may have a 
preference for authoritarian regimes that impose moderate to strong restrictions on 
political rights and civil liberties. 
China’s recent experience with the Democratic Republic of the Congo mirrors 
many of the facets of Sino-Sudanese relations.  The DRC has recently emerged from the 
ashes of the deadliest conflicts since WWII.  As a result of the First Congo War from 
1996 to 1997, the Second Congo War from 1998 to 2003, and the Kivu Conflict (2004-
2013), millions have either lost their lives or become refugees due to war, disease, and 
starvation. 
                                                            
36 China was accused of providing the Sudanese regime with weapons and aid.  The PRC has had 
to deal with similar types of criticism for its continued relationship with Iran in spite of sanctions on the 
latter.   
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Sino-Congolese economic cooperation primarily focuses on FDI in the DRC’s 
natural resources, which are complimented by a reciprocal exchange of investments in 
the finance and development of infrastructure inside the country.  Although conflict in the 
Congo failed to receive the same type of popular attention as civil war in Sudan for the 
time-frame in the data set, the DRC still had to contend with a large amount of internal 
strife that made the nation-state highly unstable.  The relative weakness of the Congolese 
government exacerbated the challenges facing the regime as Kinshasa lacked the ability 
to effectively project power and control the territory within its borders.   
These inherent political risks did not deter or obstruct investment from China as 
FDI levels increased dramatically from 2003-2010 and transformed the Congo into a 
leading destination for Chinese goods.  Once again, China exhibited a remarkable level of 
resiliency in tolerating risk as long as it felt its investments would suffer no negative 
consequences resulting from instability.  China’s lack of historical hostilities with the 
Middle East and Africa is another key component that Beijing utilizes in assessing 
political risk.  The PRC believes the absence of both a colonial history and imperial past 
provides it with an extra layer of protection in ensuring its commercial activities do not 
come under threat.  Beijing is also conscious of the neo-imperialist characterizations of 
its new role in the Developing World and goes to great lengths to portray its presence as a 
partner striving to establish relationships based on equality, respect, and mutually 
beneficial cooperation. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis employed in this chapter has summarized the statistical findings in 
order to identify the economic and political determinants that influence Chinese foreign 
direct investment in the Middle East and Africa.  The results of the models are stable and 
suggest that the Chinese state has guided outward investment to help meet broad national 
interests.  First, the models suggest that FDI concentrates in African and Middle Eastern 
economies that are major oil producers and ores and metals exporters.  Next, the models 
demonstrate that Chinese firms target poorer countries with lower per capita income for 
investment in these two developing regions.  Third, the existence of previous trade 
relations was a strong indicator of FDI within both models.  Finally, the findings on 
human rights abuse lend support to the claim that Chinese firms prefer operating in 
environments that institute moderate restrictions on political rights and civil liberties 
similar to the domestic political landscape back home.  In what follows, a discussion that 
describes the broader implications of the findings and limitations of the study will take 
place in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION  
 The goal of this dissertation has been to explain the relatively recent pattern of 
outward Chinese foreign direct investment in the Middle East and Africa.  As discussed 
in Chapter 2, I have argued that a state-centered approach offers a useful framework to 
understand Chinese FDI decisions.  After discussing the data and methods in Chapter 3, 
the prior chapter presented the results of the statistical models and offered some brief 
case studies to illustrate the aggregate statistical findings.  In this concluding chapter, I 
offer several observations about whether the results support the theory developed in 
Chapter 2.  In addition, I discuss the broader policy implications of the findings, while 
also commenting on some of the limitations of this study. 
 
Theory and Findings 
As noted, the quantitative analysis lends support to some of the hypotheses that 
are part of the OLI framework.  The decision to internationalize by Chinese firms can be 
the result of advantages based upon location and competition.  Due to its tendency to 
downplay the role of the state, the OLI model, however, must be modified to factor in the 
influence of the PRC in this process.  The importance of natural resources (oil, ores, and 
metals exports in the recipient) within the model was consistent with the theoretical 
expectation that the Chinese state guides firms and facilitates FDI to meet national 
interests and sustain development.  While the results for natural resources demonstrate 
the explanatory power of state-centered approaches on Chinese FDI decision-making, 
there remains much room for future research.  China’s transformation into a more 
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industrialized economy coupled with a rise in per capita income may affect domestic 
consumption habits (i.e., a shift to conservation), energy needs, and overall FDI strategy.1  
Thus, further investigation analyzing the impact of impending economic growth on the 
direction of Chinese FDI is necessary to paint a much clearer picture. 
 The statistical findings and case studies also show that pre-existing trade has a 
significant influence on external Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa.  In addition 
to trade serving as a portent of FDI, this finding was consistent with the claim that the 
Chinese state encourages firms to leverage trade by using it as an instrument for market 
penetration.  Furthermore, Chinese FDI in these two regions primarily targets countries 
with lower per capita income.  This may suggest an inclination by Chinese firms to look 
for opportunities to expand sales in poorer hosts due to fewer obstacles to market entry 
from firms based in more mature economies, minimal competition, and cheap labor. 
 An examination of political variables on flows of Chinese FDI assisted in 
informing our understanding of the issue as well.  The interpretation of the data on human 
rights abuse and civil conflict within recipient countries highlights the gravitation of 
firms to states that resemble the institutional environment within China itself.  Therefore, 
Chinese firms seek hosts in these two parts of the Developing World that impose 
moderate restrictions on political rights and civil liberties to establish an investment 
atmosphere that is sufficiently stable.  The findings also suggest that Chinese firms are 
capable of absorbing relatively high levels of political risk as long as FDI is believed to 
be secure.  Scholars may find it necessary to test these assertions once new data becomes 
available to determine long-term trends.  Particularly, once MOFCOM decides to release 
                                                            
1 See Tuman and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015).     
91 
 
post-2010 statistics on outward Chinese FDI, more research can be done to measure the 
impact, if any, of contemporary political phenomena on investment behavior, including 
further consolidation of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Spring in the 
Middle East. 
 
Research Limitations 
Diagnostic tests for a variety of issues (e.g., multicollinearity, unit effects, etc.) 
suggested that the findings were not compromised by problems that frequently cause 
statistical bias.2  The data does, however, have its limitations.  The pooled cross-sectional 
time-series employed in this study is not very long due to MOFCOM’s decision to only 
release FDI statistics from 2002-2010.  It is possible that observations for additional years 
would change the results of the models.  The results are also preliminary and the overall 
model itself contains just a moderate number of independent variables.  Still, the 
independent variables in the model capture a number of broad influences that have been 
hypothesized to have an effect on Chinese FDI.  Thus, while the inclusion of additional 
variables might be useful, it is unlikely that a major factor has been omitted from the 
statistical analysis.  Indeed, despite these shortcomings, one can confidently say that the 
findings are relatively robust and supported by qualitative examples that have allowed for 
generalizable statements to be made regarding the data. 
In addition, this study has not examined competing theoretical explanations of the 
causes, or effects, of Chinese FDI.  While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
provide an in-depth analysis of alternatives approaches, a brief treatment of rival theories 
                                                            
2 In some cases, the introduction of appropriate controls in the methods addressed the potential 
problems (e.g., heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation).  
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may be useful in presenting a more well-rounded discussion on the topic.  System studies 
are broadly categorized as paradigms that explain how different components within a 
political system interact with each other.  As a result, systems analysis can provide an 
important school of thought in addressing the root causes and/or consequences of Chinese 
FDI from a contending point of view. 
In particular, world-systems theory may hypothesize that Chinese FDI is creating 
a new core-periphery relationship with China as a new entrant to the core that is causing a 
shift in relations from the periphery.  Parts of this perspective argue that structural 
changes in the international system along with sub-systemic actions have provided the 
impetus for regional alterations.  Therefore, China’s position as a rising super power 
within the overall international system allows it to capitalize on its status by using 
hegemony to transform sub-systemic relations in the Middle East and Africa.3  The 
ability of China to undermine the sub-systemic status quo within these two developing 
areas and alter the structure to its benefit through the injection of FDI certainly falls 
within the framework of a world-systems outlook.  Although a systemic lens emphasizes 
that the system is kept in place through coercion, which China is attempting to avoid, 
                                                            
3 See Christopher Chase-Dunn.  “Social Evolution and the Future of World Society.”  Journal of 
World-Systems Research, 11, 2 (December 2005): 187-188 for a discussion on the challenges China can 
pose to American economic hegemony from a world-systems perspective.  For a competing framework 
within system studies, see William I. Robinson.  “The transnational state and the BRICS: a global 
capitalism perspective.”  Third World Quarterly, 36, 1 (January 2015): 1-21.  Robinson argues that China’s 
rise will not result in rivalry with traditional members of the core, but rather a new pole of power that will 
be integrated into the global capitalist system and allow for its continuity.  See Robinson, pp. 10 and 17 for 
his discussion on China-US relations.  
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aspects of world-systems theory may be able to contribute to an improved 
conceptualization of Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa.4  
 
Policy Implications  
 China’s decision to go global in terms of outward FDI provides opportunities for 
greater academic scholarship on a number of inter-related issues with important policy 
implications.  China’s relatively new presence in the Middle East and Africa being a form 
of corporate recolonization or neo-imperialism is one characterization that has become a 
critique of the Mainland’s economic activities in the Developing World.5  Certain aspects 
of the approach adopted by Chinese firms are similar to traditional European colonialism.  
The building of infrastructure with the sole purpose of maximizing the extraction of 
resources is reminiscent of the uneven development that was a trademark of colonial 
exploitation.  Claims of questionable labor practices and poor working conditions also 
plague Chinese factories within the region and continent. 
 On the other hand, China is aware of these comparisons and strives to portray its 
relationship with developing areas as an equal partnership.  Consequently, Chinese FDI 
extends beyond the singular goal of acquiring oil, ores, and metals.  Chinese firms and 
policy makers are quick to emphasize their role in financing projects to build schools, 
roads, and hospitals that are meant to benefit countries as a whole.  They underscore the 
                                                            
4 Lateral pressure theory may also provide another useful lens in explaining external Chinese FDI 
patterns.  In particular, as it relates to China’s domestic growth serving as the basis for its international 
expansion, especially in relation to securing access to strategically vital natural resources.  For an in-depth 
account of lateral pressure, see Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North.  “Lateral Pressure in International 
Relations: Concept and Theory.”  in Manus I. Midlarsky, Editor.  Handbook of War Studies.  Winchester, 
Mass.: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989, pp. 289-326. 
5 See Manji and Marks, Chapter 6 for a representative example of this outlook.    
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domestic job creating measures that are part of joint venture deals as well.6  Additionally, 
China, unlike the West, can cite cultural bonds and traditional ties, such as the Silk Road, 
that date back over two thousand years and a non-existent history of colonial and imperial 
practices to help solidify the notion of seeking mutually beneficial cooperation.7  Despite 
this very careful approach, China, as it deepens its presence in the Middle East and 
Africa, may find itself contending with security dilemmas that challenge Beijing’s ability 
to maintain strict adherence to its policy of neutrality and non-intervention in internal 
host politics. 
Another byproduct of China going global is the potential for confrontation 
between Beijing and other states as the former seeks to secure multiple avenues for the 
finite natural resources it needs to continue economic growth and further 
industrialization.  In particular, the economic activities of Chinese firms in the Middle 
East and Africa provide an opportunity for tensions to emerge between China on one side 
and the US and Europe on the other as competition for natural resource acquisition 
intensifies.  Given the large and visible presence of the United States in both the region 
and continent, American policy makers have begun to closely monitor Chinese FDI 
projects and analyze the possible negative economic consequences they may have for the 
                                                            
6 These agreements often times carry a clause that for every Chinese worker there needs to be 
either an equivalent or greater number of native laborers.  For example in the DRC, the Sino-Congolese 
Cooperation Agreement dictates that there must be a two-to-one ratio of Congolese to Chinese workers in 
joint ventures.  In South Africa, there is a stipulation that an equal number of South African workers must 
be employed alongside their Chinese counterparts.    
7 In addition to shielding China from criticism, this fact may help firms accept more political risk 
in the hopes that antagonistic politics at the domestic level does not target Chinese entities due to their 
policy of non-intervention in internal affairs.  Another factor that, in the eyes of policy makers, may serve 
to embolden FDI from China in more unstable markets and insulate it from risk is that Chinese firms 
actually pay fair market value for the goods they purchase rather than engaging in occupation and theft.  
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US.  Even if America lowers its public profile in these developing areas, bilateral friction 
as a result of the pressure to procure strategically important raw materials can still lead to 
the adoption of adversarial policies that set the stage for confrontation.8 
The growing magnitude of Chinese FDI in the Developing World may hasten 
another source of tension with strong policy implications.  The possibility of indirect 
clashes between China and international financial institutions with Middle Eastern and 
African regimes caught in the middle has the chance to become a salient issue that 
deserves observation and analysis.  Chinese development aid has in some ways 
supplanted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in poorer countries in the region and 
continent.9  While the IMF and other related organizations still provide the majority of 
health and educational aid, development finance and investments in infrastructure inside 
these countries by China and its firms continues to increase rapidly.   
The latent struggle for economic influence in the Developing World between 
China and international financial institutions has already begun to surface in certain cases 
to reveal its conflictual nature.  The multi-billion dollar Sino-Congolese Cooperation 
Agreement of 2007 offers one such example as the IMF chose intervention to voice the 
organization’s objections to the terms of the deal.  The IMF felt that the contract as it was 
initially negotiated could cause the Congo to go deeper into debt and withheld a multi-
                                                            
8 It is useful to briefly mention whether or not Chinese FDI has displaced US FDI thus far.  Tuman 
and Shirali, (forthcoming 2015) have found that there was little overlap between the determinants of 
Chinese and US FDI in Latin America and Africa with the exception of oil.  Moreover, there does not seem 
to be many examples in the literature where Chinese firms in a specific host have displaced US firms.     
9 This turn of events is not just the result of the availability of assistance from China.  Chinese FDI 
and IMF failures, whether perceived or actual, have converged to create this new set of circumstances.  For 
examples from the African context, see Dambisa Moyo.  Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How 
There is a Better Way for Africa.  New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009.       
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billion dollar debt forgiveness package until the two sides revised the Sino-Congolese 
Cooperation Agreement.  Ultimately, while this particular dispute was resolved without 
much escalation, future dissension may not end as amicably.10 
 
Different Paths Forward and Suggestions for Future Research 
This dissertation has sought to fill a scholarly gap by providing an analysis based 
on a cross-sectional time-series that incorporates both economic and political variables in 
understanding the determinants of Chinese foreign direct investment in the Middle East 
and Africa.  The results of this quantitative framework answer some important questions 
about the recent flow, pattern, and disposition of external Chinese FDI to hosts in the 
region and continent.  Despite data limitations, the preliminary findings within this study 
can also present useful starting points for inquiry once more information becomes 
available.  Examining this relatively new phenomenon over time can substantiate or 
disprove the claims made here, potentially identify new underlying factors that impact 
outflows of Chinese FDI to the Middle East and Africa, clarify residual concerns on the 
effect of China’s ambitions in developing areas, and delineate the long-term trajectory of 
Chinese FDI in the Developing World.11  I hope my research can play a small role in this 
process. 
 
                                                            
10 Although the core tenets of the agreement essentially remained the same, China and the Congo 
agreed to placate the IMF and acquiesce to their demands by reducing the overall value of the deal from $9 
billion to $6 billion.  
11 In particular, scholars may want to examine additional measures, such as the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business data set and the number of veto players within each host state’s government, to 
determine if they have any effect on Chinese FDI to both regions.    
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APPENDIX A: DIAGNOSTIC CHECK FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY 
In order to diagnose for multicollinearity, I obtained the last estimates from each equation 
and then examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs).  The results are provided below.  
The average VIF for each equation, and for each covariate, are well below established 
thresholds for tolerance (less than 5 for any covariate, and less than 10 the mean VIF for 
any equation).1  
Model 1 
Covariate VIF 1/VIF 
Real Chinese Trade with 
Recipient, log (t-1) 
2.14     0.466796 
Net Oil Exports from the 
Recipient(t-1) 
1.82     0.548382 
Real GDP Per Capita 
(Lagged), log (t-1) 
1.70     0.588927 
South Africa 1.38     0.722225 
Human Rights Abuse in 
Recipient (t-1) 
1.36     0.737519 
Seychelles 1.32    0.754750 
Chinese FDI (Lagged 
Dependent Variable), log (t-
1) 
1.32     0.759665 
Inflation, log (t-1) 1.20     0.833842 
Ore and Metals Exports (% 
of Total Manufacturing 
Exports) (t-1) 
1.13     0.883734 
Mean VIF 1.49 n.a. 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                            
1 See Xin Yan and Xiao Gang Su.  Linear Regression Analysis: Theory and Computing.  
Singapore: World Scientific, 2009, p. 86.  
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Model 2 
Covariate VIF 1/VIF 
Real Chinese Trade with 
Recipient, log (t-1) 
2.18     0.459665 
Net Oil Exports from the 
Recipient(t-1) 
1.84     0.542241 
Real GDP Per Capita 
(Lagged), log (t-1) 
1.70  0.588215 
South Africa 1.39     0.719989 
Human Rights Abuse in 
Recipient (t-1) 
1.36     0.736992 
Seychelles 1.33    0.754498 
Chinese FDI (Lagged 
Dependent Variable), log (t-
1) 
1.32     0.759580 
Inflation, log (t-1) 1.20 0.830412 
Ore and Metals Exports (% 
of Total Manufacturing 
Exports) (t-1) 
1.14    0.878469 
Civil Conflict 1.03 0.966573 
Mean VIF 1.45 n.a. 
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APPENDIX B: MEAN LEVELS OF CHINESE REAL FDI, BY COUNTRY 
 
Country Mean Level of Chinese FDI 
Algeria 61.87405 
Angola 8.861823 
Bahrain    -0.415693 
Benin 6.071393 
Botswana 3.504202 
Cameroon .8355352 
Cape Verde .2644923 
Chad 3.35476 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 21.44444 
Congo, Rep. 6.546314 
Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 1.46646 
Djibouti .9408844 
Egypt 11.08841 
Equatorial Guinea 4.394052 
Eritrea -.0007468 
Ethiopia 8.522317 
Gabon 8.966294 
Gambia .0423106 
Ghana 2.995679 
Guinea 8.810956 
Iran 13.77145 
Jordan -1.491258 
Kenya 5.793137 
Kuwait .5025735 
Lebanon .0203643 
Lesotho .39386 
Liberia 1.002057 
Libya 6.859822 
Madagascar 13.78583 
Malawi 2.511526 
Mali 3.367536 
Mauritania .282935 
Mauritius 12.49501 
Morocco 2.206121 
Mozambique 4.54709 
Namibia 1.855096 
Niger 22.00077 
Nigeria 117.3371 
Oman 3.388753 
Qatar 4.691858 
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Rwanda 3.8571 
Saudi Arabia 54.79743 
Senegal 1.37097 
Seychelles .0595631 
Sierra Leone 4.601108 
South Africa 802.5896 
Sudan 59.19545 
Syria -2.826522 
Tanzania 5.513555 
Togo 2.168764 
Tunisia .5363863 
Turkey 2.367193 
Uganda -.0957649 
United Arab Emirates  38.59872 
Yemen 17.3004 
Zambia 67.80717 
Zimbabwe 2.79706 
 
Note: This table reports the average level of real Chinese FDI received during the study 
period.  The dependent variable employed for the regressions is the natural log of 
Chinese FDI. 
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